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Abstract
Macroeconomics has paid profound attention to policy studies over the last decades. My
PhD thesis discusses how to assess fiscal policy over the business cycle in unconventional
but justifiable environments - either with nonstandard preferences or with less-studied
idiosyncratic risks.
Chapter 1 justifies policy interventions with exotic preferences. I study a production
economy with preferences featuring loss aversion, a core concept commonly accepted in
behavioral economics. The representative household obtains utility directly from fluctu-
ations of asset returns, in addition to consumption. I ask whether loss aversion affects
equilibrium conditions, whether equilibrium is efficient, and what Ramsey optimal fiscal
policy is. I show analytically that the more loss aversion and the more concerns on the
psychological utility, the less investment in risky assets in the risky steady state of equi-
librium. Numerical results show that capital stock, consumption and output decrease as
loss aversion parameters increase. I uncover that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient
as long as the agent is loss averse due to pecuniary externality. The household does not
internalize the price effect on her welfare so that she invests more in capital than the op-
timum requires. The Ramsey allocation rationalizes policy interventions: the government
should tax capital accumulation to reduce capital stock and raise equity premium.
Chapter 2 studies the effect of fiscal policy on investment and the welfare of heteroge-
neous agents over the business cycle considering independent and identically distributed
idiosyncratic investment risks whose volatility is assumed to be countercyclical in line
with data. All entrepreneurs make identical saving and portfolio choices each period,
allowing for exact aggregation which facilitates computation. The model matches income
inequality and dynamics of the income distribution over the cycle in the US data. The
government sets rules of capital income tax rate and debt as functions of current output.
I calibrate the cyclicality of fiscal policy to the US data as the baseline and adjust the
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parameters indicating cyclicality to study the effect of counterfactual policy. Both capi-
tal tax and debt policy create welfare conflicts between entrepreneurs and workers. The
policy that optimizes utilitarian social utility specifies that the capital income tax rate
should increase by 0.45 percentage point and the debt should increase by 0.37% facing
a 1% decrease in output. It is possible that the government should reduce the capital
tax in the recession if it increases the weight of workers on social welfare. The impulse
response of aggregate variables to a negative productivity shock indicates that in general,
the higher capital tax rate and the less debt when the adverse shock hits, the higher
capital and output in the early stage after the shock. The result of the welfare conflict is
robust to a constant labor tax and a varying consumption tax, but not to the removal of
countercyclicality of idiosyncratic investment risks or to no idiosyncratic risks.
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Chapter 1
Loss Aversion, Inefficiency and
Policy Interventions
1.1 Introduction
Macroeconomists have paid profound attention to the behavior of economic agents over
the business cycle and policy analysis related to it. However, an assumption pervades the
majority of studies that economic agents care only about allocations, such as individual
consumption, leisure and public goods. This convention possibly omits some components
which may play a role in the welfare. Results from economic experiments suggest that
people feel excited if they gain in the investment; in addition, a loss affects a person more
than the same amount of gain1. This phenomenon is named as ”loss aversion”.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose loss aversion as a part of prospect theory. Loss
aversion postulates that economic agents evaluate decisions based on a reference point,
which implies that utility can be generated from not only the absolute value, but also
the change of assets. Besides, economic agents value gains differently from the way in
which they value losses as experimental evidence shows. They obtain a greater disutility
from a loss than a utility from the same amount of gain. If we use the utility function
representation,
−v(−x) > v(x), when x > 0; and v(0) = 0,
where x indicates the gain from investment and v denotes the loss aversion utility from
gain.
1Such an example can be found in Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
1
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Loss aversion has been confirmed not only from experiments, but also by empirical
studies focusing on certain industries. For instance, Pope and Schweitzer (2011) test for
the presence of loss aversion using a large sample of professional golfers’ performance
on the PGA Tour. They verify that even the best golfers show loss aversion. Camerer
et al. (1997) use data on cabdrivers in New York City to reveal that drivers are afraid of
falling below a target income, consistent with loss aversion. The driver decides working
hours of a day largely depending on the comparison between actual daily income and the
target: the driver stops sooner if he gets the target income more quickly; furthermore,
earning less than the target shows more effect than the same amount of earning more
than the same target.
Loss aversion is often employed in finance and behavioral economics. For example,
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) apply loss aversion to explain the equity premium puzzle.
They focus on a certain assets market and claim that a reasonable loss aversion degree
generates the equity premium if agents check their account once a year. Ang et al. (2006)
show that agents place greater weight on downside risk, indicating loss aversion in indi-
vidual investors. Ang et al. (2006) recover that large institutional investors exhibit loss
aversion by matching investment behaviors with prospect theory.
Macroeconomics still rarely adopts loss aversion. A model without loss aversion may
misunderstand agents’ behaviors and lead to an inefficient policy. So I ask whether a model
with loss aversion behaves differently in the competitive equilibrium. I also investigate
the efficiency of competitive equilibrium and derive Ramsey optimal fiscal policy.
I embed loss aversion in a business cycle model. Besides consumption, a loss averse
household obtains utility from expected gains from risky assets relative to returns to
riskfree assets. I characterize the competitive equilibrium and discuss analytically how
capital stock in equilibrium evolves with loss aversion degree indicating how much a loss
affects the welfare relative to a gain, and with relative weight of loss aversion utility
showing the concerns on direct impact of fluctuations of asset prices on the welfare. I
show that the more loss aversion and the more concerns on the loss aversion utility, the
less investment in risky assets in the risky steady state2 equilibrium.
I show analytically that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient by considering a
constrained optimality problem in a two-period model following Davila et al. (2012).
2The risky steady state is the point where agents choose to stay at a given date if they expect future
risk and if the realization of shocks is 0 at this date.
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The atomistic household takes prices as given and does not internalize the influence of
her choice on prices. With loss aversion preferences, prices directly affect the utility so
that pecuniary externality creates a gap between the equilibrium and the optimum even
without any idiosyncratic risks and frictions. Then I construct a social planner’s problem
in which the planner has identical preferences with the household and maximize the
household’s welfare subject to feasibility constraint. Since prices appear in the preferences,
I employ the method by Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) in which the social planner assigns
capital stock for the representative agent and keeps the formation of market prices. The
social optimum differs from the competitive equilibrium as long as the agent is loss averse
in the characterization.
I carry out quantitative analysis. I plot the risky steady state as a function of loss
aversion parameters. The numerical result shows that an increase in either loss aversion
parameter provokes a drop in capital stock, output and consumption. Given asset prices,
stronger fear for loss causes the household to invest less on capital. Then less capital
input results in less output and consumption. I depict the constrained optimum and the
competitive equilibrium as loss aversion parameters vary to confirm that the equilibrium
deviates from the optimum. The cost of fluctuations over the business cycle in my model,
measured by consumption equivalent variation, reaches more than 5%, which is much
more than many previous estimations. This is because the household directly obtains
disutility from potential losses from investment in addition to more volatile consumption.
I wonder whether policy interventions can correct the inefficiency of competitive equi-
librium. I add into the model a government sector which finances its spending by a
lump-sum tax and a distortionary capital income tax and explore the Ramsey fiscal pol-
icy. Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) demonstrate that the optimal capital income tax
rate tends to zero in the long run, which has been confirmed when relaxing a number of
assumptions. Chari et al. (1994) study the optimal policy in the business cycle quanti-
tatively and show that the long-run mean of capital tax rate is close to zero even with
a relatively high risk aversion. In my model, the Ramsey policy requires a relatively
high capital income tax (about 65%). Simultaneously, the government should levy a low
lump-sum tax to balance the budget. The impulse response to a negative productivity
shock generates two different qualitative behaviors of policy instruments. Without loss
aversion, both the capital income tax rate and the lump-sum tax remain constant after
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the shock. With loss aversion, they move dramatically in an opposite direction: the tax
rate increases while the lump-sum tax drops.
This paper is in line with a great literature of business cycle and policy analysis,
especially works on fiscal policy over the business cycle. In addition to what I have
mentioned above, for example, Aiyagari et al. (2002) study the optimum quantity of debt
based on a model of a large number of infinitely-lived households whose saving behavior
is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. They find that
the welfare gains from reaching the optimum level of debt are small. Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2004), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), Chugh (2006) and Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) address the optimal policy issues by considering imperfect competition,
sticky prices, sticky wages and sticky prices together, and frictional labor markets over
the cycle, respectively. Nevertheless, none of them incorporate exotic preferences.
This paper belongs to macroeconomic studies that use exotic preferences in a business
cycle model. Angeletos and Calvet (2006) and Angeletos (2007) both apply Epstein-Zin
preferences to see the effect of idiosyncratic production risks on the equilibrium over the
business cycle and growth. Epstein-Zin preferences, by differentiating the elasticity of
intertemporal substituion from risk aversion, help to figure out that the underlying factor
lies in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Croce et al. (2012) investigate the
optimal fiscal policy which functions through the channel of asset prices. They also use
Epstein-Zin preferences to generate a realistic equity premium. Chugh (2007) derives
Ramsey fiscal and monetary policies with habit formation. Habit persistence partly pre-
dicts highly persistent inflation. But above research never applies loss aversion preferences
that feature asymmetry in the effect of gains and losses and discontinuous at the reference
point.
The closest studies to my paper are from a growing literature that uses loss aversion in
the general equilibrium. Barberis et al. (2001) study asset pricing considering loss aversion
in financial wealth and discover that their framework can explain the high mean, excess
volatility and predictability of stock returns. Barberis and Huang (2001), and Berkelaar
and Kouwenberg (2009) explore equilibrium firm-level stock returns with loss aversion in
two different economies. Andries (2012) and Pagel (2015) readdress asset pricing with
loss aversion. Pagel (2013) uses the expectation-based reference-dependent preference
featuring loss aversion to explain empirical observations about life-cycle consumption.
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Ahrens et al. (2017) develop a theory under loss aversion which successfully explains
why prices are more sluggish upwards than downwards in response to temporary demand
shocks, while they are more sluggish downwards than upwards in response to permanent
demand shocks as empirical evidence finds. Lepetyuk and Stoltenberg (2013) reconcile
the changes in consumption inequality in the data in response to the increase in income
inequality with loss aversion preferences. Yet none of these papers construct models in a
production economy; in addition, government policies are not involved in these settings.
Thus I consider that this paper is a novel attempt in the theoretical aspect.
The paper is organized as follows. I develop a private economy model with loss aversion
in Section 2 and determine the competitive equilibrium. I also analyze the steady state
of this economy. In Section 3, I show the inefficiency of competitive equilibrium and
characterize the constrained optimum. Section 4 is devoted to the numerical analysis.
Section 5 formulates a model with a government and obtains the Ramsey policy. Section
6 concludes.
1.2 The Model with Loss Aversion
This section presents a real business cycle model with preferences encompassing consump-
tion and utility from shifts in asset returns. The latter features loss aversion. To model
the investment choice of a loss averse household, two assets are traded in asset markets:
one is risky while the other is riskfree. I characterize the competitive equilibrium. I find
that loss aversion does not affect the deterministic steady state but does influence the
risky steady state by studying comparative statics.
1.2.1 Economy
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative household that is endowed
with one unit of time in each period. The household maximizes expected lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt, β ∈ (0, 1). (1.1)
A representative firm produces a single consumption good with labor nt and capital
kt. The total output Yt is consumed or used to augment capital stock. The feasibility
6 CHAPTER 1. LOSS AVERSION
constraint is
ct + kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)kt, (1.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate.
I assume that the production function, Yt = ZtF (kt, nt), has constant returns to scale
and that it is increasing and concave in each argument. Exogenous aggregate productivity,
Zt, follows an AR(1) process,
lnZt+1 = ρz lnZt + σz
z
t+1, (1.3)
where ρz denotes the autoregressive parameter for the moving process of productivity, σz
represents the standard deviation of one-time technological innovation and the innovation,
zt+1, is independently distributed as a standard normal for any t ≥ 0.
Product and factor markets are assumed to be competitive.
1.2.2 Firm
The firm takes as given the wage rate, wt, and the rental rate, rt, hires labor and rents
capital from the household, produces final consumption goods and maximizes its profit,
Πt = ZtF (kt, nt)− rtkt − wtnt. (1.4)
The production follows a constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical technology F , where
it is strictly increasing and concave in any input.
1.2.3 Household
The representative household is endowed with some initial capital, k0. At period t, the
household receives income from labor supply, capital rental and non-state-contingent pri-
vate bonds traded among individuals, and then determines the amount of consumption,
capital accumulation and the purchase of next period’s individual assets by maximizing
(1) subject to following sequences of budget constraints and nonnegativity constraints:
ct + kt+1 + at+1 = wtnt + rtkt + (1− δ)kt +Rft at, (1.5)
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ct ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ nt ≤ 1. (1.6)
Rft is the gross return of private bonds from t − 1 to t, depending only on the state
at t − 1, so that individual assets are riskfree. The uncertainty of the return to capital
rental arises from unknown productivity shocks. When the household makes investment
decisions, she undertakes risks if she augments capital stock while avoids risks if purchasing
bonds.
1.2.4 Preference Specification
As the main feature of this paper, I assume that the household enhances her utility,
in addition to consumption, if she gains in investment. It implies that the household
cares about fluctuations in investment markets independent of total wealth. It reflects
the observation that individuals in reality feel excited when they succeed in the capital
market. Mathematically, I express the instantaneous utility at t consisting of consumption
at the current period, ct, and expected gains from capital investment next period with
respect to a reference point defined later, Xt+1, as
Ut = u(ct) + ηβEt [v(Xt+1)] ,
where u is strictly increasing, concave and two times continuously differentiable in c, and v
reflects loss aversion utility. η represents the relative weight on the utility from expected
gain compared to consumption. The preference returns to the standard model merely
containing consumption when η = 0. I formulate preferences over consumption and ex-
pected gain of capital investment in the spirit of Barberis et al. (2001), whose preference
specification consists of two additively separable terms: utilities from consumption and
expected one-period-after fluctuations in financial asset values. I also consider the sce-
nario when the agent obtains the loss aversion utility from realized gain, that is, ηv(Xt).
The corresponding first-order conditions show that the timing alternative does not affect
investment decisions.
In particular,
v(Xt+1) =
Xt+1, if Xt+1 ≥ 0;λXt+1, if Xt+1 < 0.
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The parameter λ denotes the loss aversion degree and it is assumed to be strictly
larger than 1, indicating that a certain amount of loss impacts greater in absolute values
than the same amount of gain. The functional form of v, a linear function with a kink,
is a simplification from the literature of prospect theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
suggest the utility function over gains and losses:
v˜(X) =
X
γ, if Xt+1 ≥ 0;
−λ(−X)γ, if Xt+1 < 0.
Yet it only improves the quantitative behavior with prospects of only gains or only losses.
Loss aversion remains as long as the link exists. For simplicity, I assume a linear form. In
addition, I filter out some other distinctive features of prospect theory since I only focus on
loss aversion in the production economy. To summarize, my use of v(X) captures a central
idea of prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that people care about changes
in financial wealth and that they are loss averse over these changes. Some recent studies
such as Pagel (2013) and Pagel (2013) model loss aversion with the expected consumption
as the reference point. I argue that this modelling way has modified the original prospect
theory. My paper still targets on financial wealth instead of consumption in the preference
component of loss aversion.
I define the gross returns to capital rental as Rkt = rt + 1 − δ. In this paper, Xt+1 is
assumed to have the form:
Xt+1 = kt+1R
k
t+1 − kt+1Rft+1.
At t+1, the household receives kt+1R
k
t+1 from investment in risky assets. In fact, kt+1R
k
t+1
is also the total financial wealth in equilibrium. I use the gross return to private bonds as
the reference point for the household. kt+1R
f
t+1 is the opportunity cost of investment in
risky assets: suppose that an agent has already invested kt+1 in risky assets and expects
to earn kt+1R
k
t+1, yet she would get kt+1R
f
t+1 if investing in bonds. Then if R
k
t+1 > R
f
t+1,
it is defined as a gain; if Rkt+1 < R
f
t+1, a loss. Denote Dt+1 = R
k
t+1 − Rft+1 as equity
premium, so I can interprete Xt+1 as a product of equity premium and capital stock and
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rewrite Xt+1 = Dt+1 · kt+1. Then
v(Xt+1) = v(Dt+1) · kt+1
as the result of linear transformation. At t, the agent only has one unknown, t + 1’s
productivity Zt+1. Since the distribution of innovation is common knowledge, the agent
computes the next period’s expected gain conditional on current information3.
Since my paper concentrates on how loss aversion influences investment, I simplify the
model by an exogenous labor supply in equilibrium. I choose incomplete markets because
of several reasons. First, the reference point of loss aversion utility may be unclear in
complete markets. An investor could consider various measures as the benchmark of
expected gains. Second, incomplete markets better mirror the real world.
1.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
I define a competitive equilibrium as a stochastic sequence of prices {wt, rt, Rft+1}∞t=0, a
stochastic sequence of allocations {ct, kt+1, at+1}∞t=0, such that
(1) Given prices {wt, rt, Rft+1}∞t=0, the household maximizes her lifetime utility by
choosing {ct, kt+1, at+1}∞t=0, and the firm maximizes its profit by choosing the amount
of inputs.
(2) Bond market clearing: at+1 = 0 for all t.
(3) Goods market clearing: feasibility constraint, (1.2), holds.
In equilibrium labor supply is inelastic, nt = 1. Factor prices are determined by solving
the representative firm’s problem.
rt = ZtFk(kt, 1), (1.7)
wt = ZtFn(kt, 1). (1.8)
Euler equations below characterize the solution to the household’s maximization prob-
lem:
3Take a simple example: the agent knows that at t + 1, the bond will be sold at $0.9; from today’s
high productivity and the distribution of its evolution process, she calculates that next period the gross
return to risky assets will reach $1.3 with a probability of 80% while may decline to $0.7 otherwise. Then
the total after-one-period expected gain net of the opportunity cost equals to $ (0.32− 0.04λ).
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u′(ct) = βEt
[
Rkt+1u
′(ct+1)
]
+ ηβEt [v(Dt+1)] , (1.9)
u′(ct) = βR
f
t+1Et [u
′(ct+1)] . (1.10)
Using equilibrium conditions, I rewrite the gross return to capital in period t + 1,
Rkt+1 = Zt+1Fk(kt+1, 1) + 1 − δ. By construction, only Z remains unknown in period t.
Then if we focus on the loss aversion utility from gain, the individual is indifferent from
investing in risky and riskfree assets when the realized value of Zt+1, denoted by zt+1,
equals zidft+1 =
Rft+1−1+δ
Fk(kt+1,1)
, the solution to the equation Rkt+1 = R
f
t+1. z
idf
t+1 will be larger if
the agent accumulates more capital. It is confirmed by differentiating zidft+1,
dzidft+1
dkt+1
=
Fk(kt+1, 1)
dRft+1
dkt+1
−
(
Rft+1 − 1 + δ
)
Fkk(kt+1, 1)
(Fk(kt+1, 1))
2 > 0,
where
dRft+1
dkt+1
=
−u′′(ct)− βRft+1Et
[
u′′(ct+1)Rkt+1
]
βEt [u′(ct+1)]
> 0.
Only if the realization of next period’s productivity surpasses this cutoff can the agent gain
from her investment. Thus, a large cutoff squeezes the gain possibility, bringing about
pessimistic beliefs about the expected payoff. It implies that more capital investment
leads to more loss aversion disutility given the same expected productivity.
With the above analysis, I rewrite the expected utility from next period’s investment
gain conditional on t’s information as
Et [v (Xt+1)]
= kt+1Et [v (Dt+1)]
= kt+1
[∫ zidft+1
0
λ
(
Rkt+1 −Rft+1
)
dFZt+1|Zt=zt(z) +
∫ ∞
zidft+1
(
Rkt+1 −Rft+1
)
dFZt+1|Zt=zt(z)
]
,
where FZt+1|Zt=zt(z) is the conditional cumulative distribution function of next period’s
productivity, Zt+1, in period t. Simply put, I separate the utility from expected gains
from that from expected losses and calculate each conditional expectation. The formu-
lation is motivated by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), where the reference point of unknown
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future consumption is defined as continually updated conditional expectations of future
consumption in a dynamic environment. Hence this modelling way can be viewed as a
special case of their more general setting, in the sense that at a certain period, the ref-
erence point is fixed according to the history up to that period with only productivity
unsure, while their model embraces both uncertain realizations and uncertain reference
points.
Given the stochastic process of productivity, I simplify the expression of Et [v(Dt+1)]
in the fashion of certainty equivalence. Appendix B describes the detail of simplification.
Et [v(Dt+1)] =Fk(kt+1, 1)z
ρ
t e
σ2z
2
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
+
+ (1− δ −Rft+1)
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)]
,
where Φ(·) represents the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribu-
tion. Technically speaking, to compute the conditional expectation avoids the discussion
of kinks around the reference point so that it facilitates further analysis.
I study the comparative statics of parameters on equilibrium allocations by deriving
the effect of loss aversion parameters, λ and η, on capital in equilibrium. I differentiate
the first Euler equation (1.9) with respect to λ and η, respectively.
− u′′(ct)dkt+1
dλ
= βEt
[
u′′(ct+1)
(
Rkt+1
)2
+ u′(ct+1)Zt+1Fkk(kt+1, 1)
] dkt+1
dλ
+
+ ηβ
{∫ zidft+1
0
[(
Rkt+1 −Rft+1
)
+ λ
(
Zt+1Fkk(kt+1, 1)− dR
f
t+1
dkt+1
)
dkt+1
dλ
]
dFZt+1|Zt=zt(z)+
+
∫ ∞
zidft+1
(
Zt+1Fkk(kt+1, 1)− dR
f
t+1
dkt+1
)
dkt+1
dλ
dFZt+1|Zt=zt(z)+
+(λ− 1)
(
zidft+1Fk(kt+1, 1) + 1− δ −Rft+1
) dzidft+1
dkt+1
dkt+1
dλ
}
.
(
zidft+1Fk(kt+1, 1) + 1− δ −Rft+1
)
equals 0 after evaluating the value of cutoff zidft+1, so
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I cross out the last line. From the above equation, I obtain
dkt+1
dλ
= ηβ
∫ zidft+1
0
(
Rkt+1 −Rft+1
)
dFZt+1|Zt=zt(z)÷
{
−βEt
[
u′′(ct+1)
(
Rkt+1
)2
+ u′(ct+1)Zt+1
Fkk(kt+1, 1)]− ηβ
{
Fkk(kt+1, 1)z
ρ
t e
σ2z
2
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
−
−dR
f
t+1
dkt+1
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)]}
− u′′(ct)
}
.
(1.11)
The divisor is positive while the dividend is negative because expected productivity
under the cutoff suggests a loss. The whole fraction is, as a result, negative, showing that
the more concerns the agent has on losses relative to gains, the less capital she accumulates
in equilibrium. Likewise,
dkt+1
dη
= βEt [v(Dt+1)]÷
{
−βEt
[
u′′(ct+1)
(
Rkt+1
)2
+ u′(ct+1)Zt+1Fkk(kt+1, 1)
]
−
− u′′(ct)− ηβ
{
Fkk(kt+1, 1)z
ρ
t e
σ2z
2
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
−
−dR
f
t+1
dkt+1
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)]}}
.
(1.12)
The quotient has the same sign as the dividend. The agent will reduce investment
with a higher weight on the loss aversion utility if she expects a loss conditional on
t’s productivity. A higher weight means that the loss aversion component gets more
important to the total utility, so that an expected loss harms her welfare more.
The following proposition summarizes comparative statics of loss aversion parameters
on equilibrium allocations.
Proposition 1. Fixing the current state, (kt, zt), and other parameters,
(1) as the loss aversion degree, λ, increases, the household reduces investment in risky
assets;
(2) as the relative weight of loss aversion utility, η, increases, the household reduces
investment in risky assets if she expects a loss and vice versa.
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1.2.6 Steady State
This subsection briefly discusses the effect of loss aversion on agents’ decisions in the
deterministic and risky steady state. It shows that the investment choice in a loss aversion
environment is the same as the case without loss aversion in the deterministic steady state.
However, in the risky steady state, the household chooses different allocations thanks to
loss aversion.
Proposition 2. In the deterministic steady state of competitive equilibrium, with and
without loss aversion, the representative household determines the same consumption and
investment allocations.
Appendix A states the proof to the proposition. The intuition is simple. I formulate
loss aversion in an intertemporal environment based on uncertainty. The deterministic
steady state rules out unpredictable shocks on future productivity. The household no
longer gains or loses because equity premium is constantly zero. The second expectation
term regarding loss aversion of (1.9) fails to come into effect.
The deterministic steady state fails to capture how loss aversion affects dynamic prop-
erties of competitive equilibrium. Instead, I study the risky steady state defined by
Coeurdacier et al. (2011): the risky steady state is the point where agents choose to stay
at a given date if they expect future risk and if the realization of shocks is 0 at this date.
From Proposition 1, I obtain the following corollary:
Corollary. An increase in the loss aversion degree, λ, reduces investment in risky assets
in the risky steady state equilibrium.
In the long run, loss aversion causes a reduction in the stock of risky assets compared
to the non-loss-aversion scenario. It differs from the effect of risk aversion because stronger
precautionary saving motives from higher risk aversion raise the long-run level of assets.
1.3 Inefficiency of Competitive Equilibrium
This section discusses efficiency of competitive equilibrium in my model. I first construct a
simplified two-period model to analyze the effect of increasing the capital stock on utility
following Davila et al. (2012). It indicates that in this simple model the competitive
equilibrium is inefficient when agents are loss averse. I then return to the baseline model
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and compare the allocations in the competitive equilibrium and the constrained optimum.
The result shows that in general, the competitive equilibrium differs from the constrained
optimum in its characterization.
1.3.1 Inefficiency of Equilibrium in a Two-Period Model
Consider an economy with a representative household that lives two periods. In the
first period, period 0, the household is endowed with e units of output and chooses the
amount of consumption, c0, capital stock, k, and bonds, a, to maximize her utility from
consumption and loss aversion utility from expected gains. In the second period, period
1, she obtains utility only from period 1’s consumption after receiving labor and asset
income. In period 0, aggregate productivity is normalized to 1; in period 1, a productivity
shock, σz, hits the economy, causing a stochastic productivity Z1.
The representative firm uses labor and capital, and produces output with a constant-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production technology. As analyzed previously, the house-
hold supplies her labor completely, n = 1, in equilibrium. The wage and the rental rate
equal the marginal products of inputs with labor evaluated at 1. The household holds
zero bond in equilibrium, a = 0.
The competitive equilibrium in this two-period model is a sequence of prices {w1, r1, Rf}
and a sequence of allocations {k, a} such that
(1) given prices, k and a solve
max
k,a
u(e− k − a) + ηβE0
[
v
(
R1 −Rf
)
k
]
+ βE0
[
u
(
w1 +R1k +R
fa
)]
;
(2) r1 = z1Fk(k, 1) and w1 = z1Fn(k, 1);
(3) a = 0.
The social planner chooses an allocation, meaning that they can only adjust the level
of capital stock to affect welfare. Denote the total utility across two periods as U . I define
constrained efficiency of an allocation as follows:
Definition. The allocation k is constrained efficient if it is feasible (i.e., k ∈ [0, e]) and
if there is no other feasible allocation k′ such that U(k′) > U(k).
Whether the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient depends on whether the
planner can improve the welfare by dictating a different level of capital. Thus I con-
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sider the effect of increasing capital on the total utility following Davila et al. (2012).
Differentiating the total utility, I obtain
dU = −u′(e− k − a)(dk + da)+
+ ηβ
{
Et
[
v
(
R1 −Rf
)]
dk + kEt
[
dv
[(
R1 −Rf
)]
dR1
+
d
[
v
(
R1 −Rf
)]
dRf
]}
+
+ βEt
[
u′
(
w1 +R1k +R
fa
) (
dw1 +R1dk + kdR1 +R
fda+ adRf
)]
The first-order conditions for the household’s maximization problem read
u′ (e− k − a) = βEt
[
u′(w1 +R1k +Rfa)R1
]
+ ηβEt
[
v
(
R1 −Rf
)]
,
u′ (e− k − a) = βEt
[
u′(w1 +R1k +Rfa)
]
Rf .
I simplify the expression of dU by inserting these conditions and then obtain
dU = ηβ
{
Et
[
v
(
R1 −Rf
)]
dk + kEt
[
dv
[(
R1 −Rf
)]
dR1
+
d
[
v
(
R1 −Rf
)]
dRf
]}
+
+ βEt
[
u′
(
w1 +R1k +R
fa
) (
dw1 + kdR1 + adR
f
)]
.
Note that dR1 = dr1 = z1Fkk(k, 1)dk and dw1 = z1Fnk(k, 1)dk. Since the production
technology F is homogeneous of degree 1, Fn(k, 1) + kFk(k, 1) = F (k, 1). Differentiating
both handsides with respect to k, we obtain Fnk(k, 1)dk + kFkk(k, 1)dk = 0. Therefore,
dw1 + kdR1 = z1Fnk(k, 1)dk + z1kFkk(k, 1)dk = 0.
This subsection focuses on the efficiency of equilibrium, thus I talk about the impact
of a small deviation from equilibrium. After inserting market equilibrium conditions and
above expressions, I differentiate the return to riskfree assets from the first-order condition
with respect to capital evaluating a = 0, and get
dRf
dk
=
−u′′ (e− k)− βRfEt [u′′ (w1 +R1k)R1]
βEt [u′ (w1 +R1k)]
> 0, (1.13)
16 CHAPTER 1. LOSS AVERSION
dU |equilibrium
dk
= ηβk
[∫ zidf
0
λ
(
dRk
dk
− dR
f
dk
)
dFZ1|Z0=1(z) + λ
(
zidfFk(k, 1) + 1− δ −Rf
) dzidf
dk
+
+
∫ ∞
zidf
(
dRk
dk
− dR
f
dk
)
dFZ1|Z0=1(z)−
(
zidfFk(k, 1) + 1− δ −Rf
) dzidf
dk
]
= ηβk
{[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidf − σ2z
σz
)]
e
σ2z
2 Fkk(k, 1)−
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidf
σz
)]
dRf
dk
}
.
(1.14)(
zidfFk(k, 1) + 1− δ −Rf
)
equals 0 after evaluating the expression of cutoff, zidf ,
which implies that a change in capital does not affect the total utility through the channel
of changing the cutoff value. These two terms in the last line are both negative. It mani-
fests that a reduction in capital exerts a positive impact on the welfare in this two-period
model.
The above expression uncovers how the variation of capital in equilibrium affects the
total utility with loss aversion. First, if the household does not obtain loss aversion
utility from expected gains, η = 0, the competitive equilibrium is optimal, which directly
results from the first welfare theorem. Second, as long as the household is loss averse, a
decrease in capital from the equilibrium level heightens the welfare since the second-order
derivatives of the production function F and the utility from consumption u are negative.
The following proposition summarizes the statement.
Proposition 3. In a two-period model, the competitive equilibrium is suboptimal as long
as the household is loss averse; besides, the equilibrium capital stock is higher than the
constrained optimal level.
As the planner reduces the capital stock, the expected return to capital increases.
Meanwhile, the household expects period 1’s consumption to be lower, or, higher marginal
benefit of saving. The return to safe assets must be sufficiently low to clear the bond
market. Then the expected equity premium increases, resulting in a higher loss aversion
utility conditional on exogenous possibility of productivity.
From another perspective, the household chooses an inefficient allocation because of
pecuniary externality. The atomistic household does not internalize the prices and only
optimizes her own allocations regardless of the effect of her action on the whole economy
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through the channel of prices. On the contrary, the social planner considers the price
effect and moderates asset holdings to affect asset prices and improve the loss aversion
utility.
1.3.2 Characterize Constrained Efficiency
This subsection provides the necessary condition of constrained efficiency, the first-order
condition of the household’s maximization problem subject to the feasibility constraint.
Following the same notation in the last subsection,
dU
dk
= 0. I characterize constrained
efficiency for the baseline model with infinite periods. The constrained optimum is, in
general, different from the competitive equilibrium.
I consider a constrained-efficient social planner who assigns capital stock for the rep-
resentative agent facing identical preferences. The key issue in constructing the social
planner’s problem is how to determine the asset prices because they appear in the utility
function. Factor prices and interest rate are determined by market equilibrium conditions
in line with Bianchi and Mendoza (2013). The constrained optimum is the solution to
max
ct,kt+1
u(ct) + ηβkt+1Et [v(Dt+1)]
subject to
ct + kt+1 = ZtF (kt, 1) + (1− δ)kt,
where
Rft+1 =
u′(ct)
βEt [u′(ct+1)]
andDt+1 = R
k
t+1 −Rft+1
.
18 CHAPTER 1. LOSS AVERSION
The first-order condition for the social planner’s problem is
u′(ct) = βEt
[
Rkt+1u
′(ct+1)
]
+ ηβEt [v(Dt+1)] +
+ ηβkt+1
{[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
zρt e
σ2z
2 Fkk(kt+1, 1)−
−
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)]
dRft+1
dkt+1
}
−
− ηβEt
{
kt+2
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+2 − ρ ln zt+1
σz
)]
dRft+2
dkt+1
}
−
− ηkt
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft − ρ ln zt−1
σz
)]
dRft
dkt+1
,
(1.15)
where
dRft+1
dkt+1
=
−u′′(ct)− βRft+1Et
[
u′′(ct+1)Rkt+1
]
βEt [u′(ct+1)]
> 0,
dRft+2
dkt+1
=
u′′ (ct+1)Rkt+1
Et+1 [u′ (ct+2)]
< 0,
dRft
dkt+1
=
Et−1 [u′′ (ct)]R
f
t
Et−1 [u′ (ct)]
< 0.
The first line of (1.15) duplicates the equilibrium condition, yet there are more terms in
the optimum characterization. Line 2 and 3 suggest the same effect of a deviation from
a certain capital level as in the two-period model. Line 4 shows that a different level of
capital, kt+1, affects the loss aversion utility in period t+ 1 since capital then will evolve
through a different path, resulting in a different capital level decided in t+ 1, kt+2, which
further leads to different returns to assets. The last line indicates that a change in the
allocation in the future even influences the welfare in the past in a perfect foresight model.
In addition, increasing capital, kt+1, raises the loss aversion utility in t + 1 and in t − 1
since returns to safe assets decline accordingly. The positive influence of higher capital
exerted in t + 1 and t − 1 makes the optimization problem more complicated to analyze
than in a two-period model. I turn to numerical analysis in next section. However, the
constrained optimum is, in general, different from the competitive equilibrium, unless all
last four lines in the characterization of constrained optimum counterbalance each other
every period. Section 4 shows that even the risky steady state of equilibrium differs from
that of optimum.
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1.4 Numerical Analysis
This section presents numerical results on comparative statics of loss aversion parame-
ters on equilibrium and a comparison between the competitive equilibrium and the con-
strained optimum. I start from describing how I calibrate the model. The calibrated
model features lower capital stock in the risky steady state of equilibrium as loss aversion
parameters increase. The equilibrium differs from the constrained optimum within the
range of parameter values I attempt.
1.4.1 Calibration
I assume the consumption preference as a standard CRRA function, u(ct) =
c1−θt
1−θ , where
θ determines the degree of risk aversion and θ > 0. The production function is a Cobb-
Douglas production function, Yt = Ztk
α
t n
1−α
t , where α denotes the capital share of output
and α ∈ (0, 1).
Most of the parameter values that I use are in line with yearly data of the United
States or other estimates in the literature. I set capital share of income α = 0.36. My
selection of δ is 0.1, which is in accordance to the annual depreciation rate.
Furthermore, the discount factor, β, is calibrated to be 0.97 so that in a non-loss-
aversion economy, given the above parameters, the ratio of capital over output is roughly
2.7 in the deterministic steady state. I keep the discount factor unchanged in this sec-
tion when I introduce loss aversion in the model since loss aversion plays no role in the
deterministic steady state.
The risk aversion degree, θ, is set to be 1, which is common in the macroeconomic
literature. Note that equity premium generated from the US data is 6 percentage points
which only unrealistically high risk aversion degrees could match the moment in the busi-
ness cycle framework. Although my equilibrium simulation cannot generate the realistic
equity premium, it clearly shows that equity premium rises to a higher magnitude. It also
manifests that even small equity premium is able to considerably affect the individual be-
havior and the whole economy. From another point of view, if I add other elements to the
model or simply calibrate the current model to produce the reasonable equity premium,
we will see a much larger effect.
I assume that the autoregressive parameter for the technology shock, ρz, and the
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standard deviation for innovations, σz, are 0.81 and 0.04, respectively, in keeping with
the real business cycle literature.
Experiments report that the relative weight, η, is nearly 1 and some applications in
the literature also take 1 as a reasonable parameter value or as the upper bound of a
series of values. Research documents that the loss aversion degree, λ, varies between 2
and 3, most of which are estimated approximately equal to 2.5. So I set baseline values of
two parameters as 1 and 2.5. Table 2.1 summarizes the parameter values for the baseline
model.
Table 1.1: Parameter Values for Baseline Model
Parameters Values Descriptions
α 0.36 capital share of output
β 0.97 discounted rate
δ 0.1 depreciation rate
θ 1 risk aversion degree
ρz 0.81 autocorrelation of productivity
σz 0.04 standard deviation of productivity shock
λ 2.5 baseline loss aversion degree
η 1 baseline relative weight of loss aversion utility over consumption
1.4.2 Comparative Statics in Risky Steady State
My first exercise aims to understand the effect of loss aversion on equilibrium prices
and allocations with aggregate shocks, so I study comparative statics of loss aversion
parameters by computing the risky steady state of prices and allocations in equilibrium.
I first stabilize the loss aversion degree, λ, equal to 2.5 and change the relative weight, η,
from 0 to 1 with an interval of 0.1 to see how more concerns on investment fluctuations
impacts the behavior. I then fix η as 1 and change λ from 2 to 3 with an interval of 0.1
to see the influence of greater loss aversion.
Figure 1.1 presents the change in the risky steady state of capital as the two loss
aversion parameters vary. The values reported in the left panel are percentage changes
from the risky steady state of a non-loss-aversion model while the right panel depicts
the deviation from the base point set to be the risk steady state in the baseline model.
Supposing that positive and negative shocks hit the economy symmetrically, loss aversion
provokes a negative summed utility of accumulating capital over the whole business cycle
given a positive relative weight. An increase in either of these two parameter values
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All the values are percentage changes. In the left panel the base is set to be the risky steady state in a
standard model; in the right panel the base is the risky steady state in the baseline model with η = 1
and λ = 2.5.
Figure 1.1: Comparative Statics for Risky Steady State
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enlarges the gap between the disutility from losses and the utility from gains, which
discourages the household from investing in capital.
Table 1.2: Risky Steady State in Equilibrium (in percentage)
Variables Baseline Higher Loss Aversion
(η = 1, λ = 2.5) (η = 1, λ = 3)
Capital -1.44 -1.78
Output -0.52 -0.65
Consumption -0.18 -0.22
Gross Return to Capital 0.12 0.15
Gross Return to Bonds -0.00 -0.00
Equity Premium 0.11 0.14
All the values are percentage changes. The base is set to be the risky steady state
in a standard model.
Table 1.2 exhibits comparative statics of more price and allocation variables. I pick
up the statistics from a standard model without loss aversion, from the baseline model,
and from a model with higher loss aversion degree, λ = 3, and report the percentage
deviations in models with loss aversion taking as the base the risky steady state in a
standard model.
Both a greater relative weight and a greater loss aversion degree lead to lower invest-
ment in productive assets, capital, which further induces lower output and consumption
in the long run. Capital has a higher return because it becomes scarcer. The upward
change in equity premium originates from higher returns to capital and no significant
change in returns to bonds.
1.4.3 Comparison of Equilibrium and Constrained Optimum
I solve the competitive equilibrium and the constrained optimum, respectively, given
the baseline parameter values. Table 1.3 reports the comparison of selected prices and
allocations in risky steady state. It also shows the welfare loss from the constrained
optimum to the equilibrium measured by consumption equivalent variation. I construct
consumption equivalent, ce, such that in risky steady state,
ce1−θ
1− θ =
c1−θ
1− θ + ηβE [v(D)] .
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Thus, consumption equivalent reflects the total welfare in the long run. I set the base as
the risky steady state value of consumption equivalent at optimum.
Table 1.3: Comparison of Equilibrium and Optimum with Loss Aversion
Variables Equilibrium Constrained Optimum
Capital 4.65 2.40
Output 1.74 1.37
Consumption 1.27 1.13
Gross Return to Capital 1.034 1.106
Gross Return to Bonds 1.033 1.033
Equity Premium 0.001 0.07
Welfare Change (Consumption Equivalent Variation)
-5.27
Values of prices and allocations are in levels. The welfare is measured in per-
centage points. The base is set to be the risky steady state at optimum.
As analyzed before, capital stock in equilibrium with loss aversion, although lower than
its counterpart in a standard model, is still higher than the constrained optimum. The
household experiences a loss from lower consumption at optimum, yet obtains sufficient
compensation from the loss aversion utility because equity premium rises much. There-
fore, she is better off when moving from the competitive equilibrium to the constrained
optimum.
Obviously, the social optimum equals the competitive equilibrium without any risks
even if the model incorporates loss aversion. Thus the numerical result from the baseline
model also manifests that aggregate productivity shocks, or fluctuations over the business
cycle, incur much more welfare loss than standard models generate. Lucas (1987) finds
a negligible welfare gain if removing all the risks. Instead, the welfare gain is large in
my model because together with smooth consumption, the household no longer obtains
disutility from potential losses from investment.
Figure 1.2 illustrates that the competitive equilibrium in my model generally differs
from the constrained optimum. This exercise varies the relative weight of loss aversion
utility from 0 to 1 with an interval of 0.1 and calculates the risky steady state of equilib-
rium and constrained optimum, respectively. The left panel takes the optimum as the base
and obtains the percentage change of capital stock in equilibrium. It indicates that the
household accumulates capital more than social optimality requires. The capital stock in
equilibrium with baseline calibration almost doubles the efficient amount. Consequently,
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The left panel plots the percentage change of capital stock in the risky steady state of competitive
equilibrium compared to the constrained optimum. The right panel plots equity premium in percentage
points in equilibrium and at the optimum.
Figure 1.2: Comparison of Equilibrium and Constrained Optimum
the risk steady state of equity premium in equilibrium is much lower than the counterpart
at optimum as the right panel shows.
1.5 Government Intervention
Ineﬃciency of competitive equilibrium due to loss aversion poses the questions of whether
the government should intervene and how. This section answers these questions by adding
a government sector to the baseline model and exploring a Ramsey problem. I describe
the government’s problem directly with functional forms used in Section 4 to uncover
Ramsey optimal allocations over the business cycle by quantitative analysis.
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1.5.1 Economy
With the government, the feasibility condition of this economy becomes
ct + kt+1 + gt = Yt + (1− δ)kt, (1.16)
where {gt}∞t=0 represents a sequence of government purchases.
Government consumption is modelled as an exogenous AR(1) process,
ln gt+1 = (1− ρg) ln g¯ + ρg ln gt + σggt+1, (1.17)
where ρg denotes the autoregressive parameter for government consumption evolution,
σg represents the standard deviation of one-time innovation on government spending and
gt+1 is distributed as an independent standard normal, 
g
t+1 ∼ N(0, 1), for any t ≥ 0. g¯
captures the long-run level of government consumption.
1.5.2 Government
The government finances its expenditure by levying distortionary taxes on capital income
at rate τ kt and a lump-sum tax Tt. I assume that the tax rate, τ
k
t , is predetermined
according to the information updated until period t − 1, which implies that tax policy
is non-state-contingent. This assumption reflects the norm of fiscal policy: policymakers
usually propose and decide a taxation policy before the policy enters into force. The
non-state-contingent tax rate makes it possible to derive a simple form of zidft+1. The
lump-sum tax is state-contingent to support the Ramsey optimal allocation. I further
assume that the government does not hold any debt since the lump-sum tax is available.
The government budget constraint is
Tt + τ
k
t rtkt = gt. (1.18)
In a standard model, the government naturally applies the nondistortionary lump-sum
tax only to finance its spending. I will show that the government in my model, on the
contrary, has incentive to distort asset prices through capital income taxes to correct the
inefficiency.
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1.5.3 Household
At period t, the household receives income from labor supply, capital rental and interest
of private bonds, learns the news of next period’s taxation proposal and then determines
the amount of consumption, labor supply, capital accumulation and the purchase of next
period’s bonds. The representative household compares the expected gross returns to two
assets in the fashion described in previous sections except that the household considers
the gross return to risky assets net of capital taxes, Rkt = (1−τ kt )rt+1−δ. The indifferent
productivity level to invest in risky and riskfree assets,
zidft+1 =
Rft+1 − 1 + δ
(1− τ kt+1)αkα−1t+1
.
Providing that the government imposes a high tax on capital income, the value of zidft+1 will
be large. Hence, a higher capital tax rate not only undermines the desire of accumulating
capital, but also directly raises the expectation of losses.
With government, the household budget constraint becomes
ct + kt+1 + at+1 = wtnt +
[
(1− τ kt )rt + 1− δ
]
kt +R
f
t at − Tt. (1.19)
1.5.4 Competitive Equilibrium Conditions
The determination of factor prices remains unchanged as (1.7) and (1.8). Euler equations
incorporate identical terms as (1.9) and (1.10) with the exception that the expected loss
aversion utility per unit of capital, Et [v(Dt+1)], given the tax rate, is rewritten as,
Et [v(Dt+1)] =
(
1− δ −Rft+1
)[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)]
+
+ (1− τ kt+1)αkα−1t+1 zρt e
σ2z
2
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
.
(1.20)
1.5.5 Ramsey Problem
This subsection builds up the Ramsey problem, presents quantitative dynamics of the
optimal policy and discusses the underlying mechanism.
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Formulation of Ramsey Problem
I first clarify the timing of fiscal policy in this Ramsey problem. At time 0, the government
sets fiscal policy of every period from time 1 onwards. Particularly, the capital income
tax rate of t + 1 depends on the state of t, which is different from the normal setting in
the Ramsey literature. For example, the usual formulation requires that the government
should announce at time 0 to levy a high tax when the present productivity is high;
the government in my model, instead, claims to tax much when the productivity of last
period appears high, even if the current productivity ends up at a low level. I formulate
the Ramsey problem as follows:
max
τkt+1,Tt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c1−θt
1− θ + ηβkt+1Et [v(Dt+1)]
}
subject to
Tt + τ
k
t rtkt = gt,
ct + kt+1 + gt = ztk
α
t + (1− δ)kt,
c−θt = βEt
[
Rkt+1c
−θ
t+1
]
+ ηβEt [v(Dt+1)] ,
c−θt = βR
f
t+1Et
[
c−θt+1
]
.
Parameter values
g¯ is chosen to be 0.31 so that the government spending accounts for roughly 18% of output
in the steady state of Ramsey optimal allocations in line with the US observation. I set
ρg = 0.89 and σg = 0.07 as Chari et al. (1994) do. I summarize the parameters for the
government sector in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Parameter Values for Government Sector
Parameters Values Descriptions
g¯ 0.31 long-run government spending
ρg 0.89 persistence of government consumption
σg 0.07 standard deviation of innovation on government spending
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Results on Optimal Policy
Table 1.5 reports business cycle statistics of optimal policy instruments and other vari-
ables. All mean values are expressed in levels except that the capital income tax rate is
measured in percentage points. The relative standard deviations are computed by divid-
ing standard deviations in levels by their respective means. As a comparison, Table 1.5
also records statistics of the same variables in a standard model.
Table 1.5: Statistics under Optimal Policy
Variables Baseline Non-Loss-Aversion
mean rsd. mean rsd.
Capital Tax Rate 60.76 0.27 0 0
Lump-sum Tax 0.20 0.72 0.31 0.15
Capital 1.06 0.11 4.77 0.10
Output 1.02 0.09 1.76 0.09
Consumption 0.60 0.18 0.96 0.10
Gross Return to Capital 1.25 0.02 1.03 0.01
Gross Return to Bonds 1.03 0.05 1.03 0.01
rsd. represents the relative standard deviation. All mean values are ex-
pressed in levels expect that capital income tax rate is measured in per-
centage points.
Table 1.5 presents my major result on optimal policy: in an environment with loss
aversion, the government should tax capital income. Zero capital tax rate is suboptimal.
To overcome the inefficiency from loss aversion, the government reduces capital stock to
reach the optimum, thus it should tax capital considerably even without any idiosyncratic
risks or frictions.
A problem of asymmetric taxation comes from the tax exemption of riskfree bonds. I
can instead assume that the government taxes the revenue of bonds as well. Yet even with
symmetric taxation, the asset tax still discourages the household from investing in risky
assets, causing a higher return to capital. In addition, the tax revenue of the government
does not increase because of zero bond holdings. Hence a benevolent government would
choose asymmetric taxation as a better mechanism design because it enlarges the gap
between asset returns and heightens the welfare efficiently.
In the non-loss-aversion model, the government equalizes the lump-sum tax and its
spending. In contrast, with loss aversion the government collects tax revenues also from
capital income so that it imposes a lighter lump-sum tax.
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As for the relative standard deviations, the capital income tax rate in the standard
model keeps constant, equal to 0, over the whole cycle. In the baseline model, the gov-
ernment applies it as an effective instrument to fight against the negative impact of
fluctuations so that it varies a lot. The lump-sum tax gets more volatile because it no
longer pegs the government expenditure, but associated with the productivity shock to
balance the budget.
The result matches the argument of constrained efficient allocations. The government
should apply its instruments, which are capital income taxes and lump-sum taxes in my
model, to reduce the capital from an inefficient equilibrium level to a lower optimal level.
The planner faces a tradeoff between lower level of consumption and higher loss aversion
utility. The latter dominates the former in this model.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper discusses the behavior of a production economy over the business cycle con-
sidering loss aversion, a core concept of prospect theory commonly accepted in behavioral
economics. As far as I know, research has never applied prospect theory to a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework and policy analysis. My paper fills the gap by
modelling loss aversion as another component in addition to consumption in the repre-
sentative household’s preferences. The household expects an extra gain from investing in
risky assets, capital, relative to the same amount of riskfree assets, bonds, and acquires
positive utility. If she predicts a loss, she gets disutility whose absolute value is greater
than that of utility from the same amount of gain. Thus, fluctuations over the business
cycle affects the welfare not only indirectly by making consumption volatile, but also
directly by altering expectation on asset returns. The latter is generally negative due to
asymmetric influences on the utility of gains and losses.
I first focus on the risky steady state equilibrium and show that the more loss aversion
and the more concerns on the loss aversion utility, the less investment in risky assets in
the risky steady state. I show analytically that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient
by considering a constrained optimality problem in a two-period model. The numerical
analysis compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained optimum and confirms
the above statement in an infinite-horizon model. This is because an atomic household
30 CHAPTER 1. LOSS AVERSION
takes prices as given and fails to think about the impact of her actions on prices. The
pecuniary externality creates an inefficient equilibrium since prices enter into preferences
of a loss averse household. The equilibrium level of capital is much higher than the optimal
level because the household can obtain a higher loss aversion utility from higher equity
premium if investing less in capital.
I then add the government sector and investigate the Ramsey optimal policy. Zero
capital tax in the long run becomes suboptimal. The government should tax capital
accumulation to approach the constrained optimum.
I also find that the welfare loss from fluctuations over the business cycle is much
higher than most of estimations in standard models. This is because the household di-
rectly obtains disutility from potential losses from investment in addition to more volatile
consumption.
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Appendix
1.A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In deterministic steady state, an arbitrary variable is constant, xt = x¯, and the
standard deviation of the shock σz = 0. To prove the proposition, I only need to show
that v(D¯) = 0. Then the rest follows the same argument in the non-loss-aversion case.
First, from the steady state version of (12), R¯f = 1
β
.
Second, since v(Dt+1) is a linear function with a kink, we have that at the deterministic
steady state, Et [v(Dt+1)] = ν ·Dt+1, where I denote ν as the slope at steady state. Notice
that the slope can be any number between 1 and λ. Then (11) becomes
u′(c¯) = βR¯ku′(c¯) + ηβν(R¯k − R¯f ).
A simple algebra gives us
β(u′(c¯) + ην)R¯k = u′(c¯) + ηβνR¯f .
Recall that R¯f = 1
β
. Thus, R¯k = 1
β
and v(D¯) = 0.
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1.B Simplification of Et [v(Dt+1)]
Since lnZt+1 = ρ lnZt + σz
z
t+1 and 
z
t+1 is distributed as a standard normal, Zt+1
follows a log-normal distribution conditional on t’s information.We replicate here the
expression of Et [v(Dt+1)],
Etv(Dt+1) =
∫ zidft+1
0
λ(Rkt+1−Rft+1)dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1)+
∫ ∞
zidft+1
(Rkt+1−Rft+1)dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1),
where the conditional cumulative distribution function of shock Zt+1 with the known his-
tory until period t, FZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1) = Φ
(
ln zt+1−ρ ln zt
σz
)
when Φ(·) denotes the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. We can also derive the con-
ditional probability density function as fZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1) =
1
σzzt+1
ϕ
(
ln zt+1−ρ ln zt
σz
)
with ϕ(·)
representing the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.
Let us focus on the first term of Et [v(Dt+1)].
∫ zidft+1
0
λ(Rkt+1 −Rft+1)dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1)
= λ
∫ zidft+1
0
(zt+1Fk(kt+1, 1) + 1− δ −Rft+1)dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1)
= λ[
∫ zidft+1
0
(1− δ −Rft+1)dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1) +
∫ zidft+1
0
Fk(kt+1, 1) · zt+1dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1)]
= λ[(1− δ −Rft+1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)
+ Fk(kt+1, 1)
∫ zidft+1
0
zt+1
σzzt+1
ϕ
(
ln zt+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)
dzt+1].
∫ zidft+1
0
zt+1
σzzt+1
ϕ
(
ln zt+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)
dzt+1 =
∫ zidft+1
0
1√
2piσ
e
− (ln zt+1−ρ ln zt)
2
2σ2z dzt+1
=
∫ ln zidft+1
−∞
1√
2piσz
e
− (yt+1−ρ ln zt)
2
2σ2z eyt+1dyt+1(Let ln zt+1 = yt+1)
=
∫ ln zidft+1
−∞
1√
2piσz
e
− (yt+1−(ρ ln zt+σ
2
z))
2
2σ2z
+ρ ln zt+
σ2z
2 dyt+1
= zρt e
σ2z
2
∫ ln zidft+1
−∞
1√
2piσz
e
− (yt+1−(ρ ln zt+σ
2
z))
2
2σ2z dyt+1
= zρt e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)
.
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Thus,
∫ zidft+1
0
λ(Rkt+1 −Rft+1)dFZt+1|Zt=zt(zt+1)
= λ
[
(1− δ −Rft+1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)
+ Fk(kt+1, 1)z
ρ
t e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
.
With the same argument, we calculate the second term as well. Summing up two
parts gives us the result:
Et [v(Dt+1)] =Fk(kt+1, 1)z
ρ
t e
σ2z
2
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − (ρ ln zt + σ2z)
σz
)]
+
+ (1− δ −Rft+1)
[
1 + (λ− 1)Φ
(
ln zidft+1 − ρ ln zt
σz
)]
.
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Chapter 2
When to Tax Capital: Fiscal Policy
with Idiosyncratic Investment Risks
and Heterogeneous Agents
2.1 Introduction
Empirical studies find that wealth is highly concentrated among the rich. Heathcote
et al. (2010) document that the richest 10 percent of households in the US hold 59 per-
cent of aggregate net worth in 2007. The net worth tends to be invested in an undiversified
portfolio, even for the rich who in general have more investment options. Carroll (2001)
find that portfolios of the rich are heavily skewed toward risky assets, especially invest-
ment in their own private-held businesses. Poor diversification in investment implies high
idiosyncratic investment risks, which affect saving and investment choices, the aggregate
economy and the welfare. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic investment risks increase in the
recession, causing a larger difference in the performance of returns to investment as shown
by Bloom et al. (2016). It may amplify the drop in aggregate investment and output.
Thus idiosyncratic investment risks may provide implications on adjusting the capital
income tax or other policy instruments related to investment over the business cycle.
This paper examines the effect of fiscal policy on investment and on the welfare of
heterogeneous agents over the business cycle with a model featuring the aforementioned
facts about wealth and investment. Specifically, I ask when to increase the capital income
tax rate. Due to idiosyncratic investment risks, an increase in the capital income tax
35
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rate may exert a larger impact on the investment and on the welfare of investors than in
representative-agent models. The change in the tax policy further influences output, the
wage rate and the welfare of agents who receive labor earnings as the main income source.
I develop a model that incorporates heterogeneous agents, business cycle and a govern-
ment sector which decides fiscal policy in the framework of Angeletos (2007) considering
idiosyncratic investment risks. My model features two types of risk-averse agents: en-
trepreneurs and hand-to-mouth workers. I allow entrepreneurs to invest in their own
firms, or alternatively in non-state-contingent government bonds, but not in the private
firms held by other entrepreneurs. Private firms suffer from aggregate productivity shocks
and independent and identically distributed idiosyncratic investment risks whose variance
rises in the recession, so that low total factor productivity enlarges the gap in business
income. Together with i.i.d idiosyncratic investment risks, the aggregate shocks exert
an impact on the decision of how much to consume and to save (saving choice) and
of how much investment on risky but productive assets and on riskfree assets (portfolio
choice). Each period all entrepreneurs make identical choices because of i.i.d idiosyncratic
investment risks and no trade in capital among entrepreneurs. Hand-to-mouth workers
supply labor inelastically to the labor market. Their income differs due to idiosyncratic
labor income risks. A government levies labor and capital taxes and issues government
bonds. Specifically, the government sets rules of capital tax and bonds as functions of
log-deviation of output fixing the steady state level and lets the labor tax rate balance
the budget. These policy instruments influence entrepreneurs more directly since they
can save.
I show that to some extent the model matches the level and cyclical behavior of the
US income distribution. The simulated income distribution features large income shares
in top income groups and small income shares in bottom income groups as shown in the
Current Population Survey data. As for the cyclical property of income distribution,
the simulated result qualitatively matches most of the correlations of income shares with
output and 95/50 and 50/20 ratios.
I apply the model to carry out a policy experiment in which the government obeys
specific policy rules and chooses the parameter values indicating responses of capital tax
rate and debt to output. I first calibrate these parameters to the US fiscal policy data
as the baseline. Then I evaluate different combinations of counterfactual fiscal policy
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instruments. I find that in my heterogeneous-agent model the choice of capital tax policy
or debt policy creates welfare conflicts between entrepreneurs and workers. A policy which
specifies a high capital tax rate and a low debt level in the recession benefits entrepreneurs
while it harms workers’ welfare. The mean level of bonds rises while the average capital
tax rate declines compared to the baseline. More government bonds give entrepreneurs
insurance and crowd out capital, yet less tax burden encourages entrepreneurs to invest
more in capital. The policy slightly raises the average capital stock and the average wage
rate. The mean consumption of entrepreneurs increases due to less tax burden and higher
asset income. The government budget balance requires a higher average labor tax rate,
which causes a decrease in the mean consumption of workers. Meanwhile, the volatility
of consumption of entrepreneurs greatly increases under the policy combination. Yet
for entrepreneurs, the increase in the mean consumption outweighs the welfare loss from
a higher volatility. Workers see less mean consumption and a higher volatility. Thus,
entrepreneurs are better off and workers are worse off.
I ask when the government should tax capital more and issue more debt, and in
particular, whether to do it during a boom or a bust. In the classical business cycle
framework, the seminal paper by Chari et al. (1994) shows that the correlation of an
optimal capital income tax rate with technology shock is negative with uncontingent debt
in their baseline model. In addition, when there is a negative innovation to the technology
shock or a positive innovation to government consumption, there is a positive innovation
in the tax on private assets. My result on fiscal policy seems to confirm their finding: The
policy that maximizes the utilitarian social utility features an increase by 0.45 percentage
point in the capital tax rate and an increase by 0.37 percent in the debt level as the
output drops by one percent. Nonetheless, the welfare conflict indicates that workers
prefer a capital tax rate which increases less in the recession. The socially preferred
policy may reduce the capital tax rate in the bust if the government, instead of adopting
the utilitarian welfare criterion, puts more weight on workers. Therefore, it is possible to
overturn the result of Chari et al. (1994) such that the government should cut the capital
income tax rate in the recession.
I study the impulse responses of aggregate variables to a standard deviation of negative
aggregate productivity shock under the baseline policy combination targeted to the data
and the other three policy combinations optimizing entrepreneurs, workers and all agents,
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respectively. These policy combinations affect the behaviors of aggregate variables after
the shock. In general, the higher capital tax rate and the lower debt when the adverse
shock hits, the higher capital and output in the early stage after the shock. However,
the recovery of capital slows down and falls behind the counterparts under other policy
combinations because the average return to capital is lower. This policy also reduces
the consumption of entrepreneurs most in the beginning and cause the slowest recovery.
Under the high capital tax and the low debt level, the labor tax rate rises, which lowers
the consumption of workers more than other policies. Yet since the output and the wage
recover faster, so does the consumption of workers.
To see if my results are robust to the choice of the policy instrument that balances the
government budget, I keep the labor tax rate constant and study the cyclical property of
debt on welfare with the consumption tax rate only levied on entrepreneurs to balance
the government budget. I find that the welfare conflict still occurs in this experiment
when the government chooses debt policy. Entrepreneurs prefer a low debt level in the
recession while workers prefer a slightly high level. Workers, like entrepreneurs, favor a
procyclical capital tax policy, although the capital tax rate favored by workers rises in
the recession less than the one preferred by entrepreneurs.
I examine whether the result of the welfare conflict is robust to constant volatility
of idiosyncratic investment risks and no idiosyncratic investment risks. I find that the
welfare conflict qualitatively disappears in this two exercises.
My paper contributes to the literature of uninsured idiosyncratic investment risks,
which has demonstrated theoretically that idiosyncratic investment risks influence the
steady state of the aggregate economy or on the stationary distribution of income, earnings
or wealth. These studies find that market incompleteness may lead to underaccumulation
or overaccumulation of capital, depending on the parameterization (Angeletos (2007);
Angeletos and Calvet (2006); Covas (2006); Meh and Quadrini (2006)). Other scholars
apply the framework with idiosyncratic investment risks to explain questions about fiscal
policy (Angeletos and Panousi (2009), Panousi (2010)), international difference of growth
(Angeletos and Panousi (2011)) and the like. Since aggregate shocks are missing, their
studies are silent about the cyclical behavior or the welfare change over the business cycle.
My paper, on the contrary, adds aggregate shocks to the framework of Angeletos (2007).
The classic Krusell and Smith (1998) framework requires the entire wealth distribution
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as a state variable. Since the wealth distribution is an infinite-dimensional object, the
computation of such a model with aggregate risks is difficult. My model provides a
tractable tool to analyze the fluctuations of aggregate economy and income distribution
and assess policies over the business cycle under the setting of heterogeneous agents
because it allows for exact aggregation, or equivalent to say, I can find a representative
agent to study the behaviors of all agents.
This paper is closer to the recent studies embedding aggregate shocks into the frame-
work with idiosyncratic investment risks. Goldberg (2014) sets up a framework with
idiosyncratic investment risks in the business cycle. My paper differs from his in a few
ways. First, I model incomplete markets with a unique non-state-contingent bond being
the only security in the market; Goldberg provides state-contingent promises but with
moral hazard. Second, he aims to build on a theoretical framework which incorporates
uninsured idiosyncratic investment risks, aggregate shocks and borrowing constraint while
I build up this model to help answer questions about policy analysis. Another example
is the work of Nezafat and Slavik (2015), who construct a production-based asset pricing
model with aggregate risks, idiosyncratic investment risks and financial frictions to ex-
plain the high volatility of asset prices. I, instead, talk about welfare and the assessment
of fiscal policies.
The paper also belongs to the literature on fiscal policy. These studies usually either
assume a representative agent and explore the effect of policy on the macroeconomy, ne-
glecting the distributive issues; or they do consider heterogeneity but exclude aggregate
risks, which makes them unable to discuss how effectively a government modifies fiscal pol-
icy to improve welfare when witnessing aggregate economic fluctuations. The exceptions
are Werning (2007) and Bassetto (2014). Both employ complete markets to simplify the
solution to the optimal policy problem. In contrast, I build up the problem in incomplete
markets, in line with empirical evidence. In addition, Werning (2007) focuses on whether
to smooth the tax rate while Bassetto (2014) builds up a model without capital so that
the model is unable to assess the capital income tax. I focus on when to tax capital and
issue debt based on the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I extend Angeletos (2007)’s framework
to model business cycles in Section 2 and characterize equilibrium in Section 3. In Section
4, I quantitatively study the income shares of different income groups and their cyclical
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properties generated by my model. I also make a comparison to the data. Section 5 carries
out experiments on fiscal policy. Section 6 examines the robustness of policy evaluation
with a constant labor tax and a consumption tax, constant idiosyncratic investment risks
and without idiosyncratic investment risks. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Economy
The economy is populated with two types of agents: entrepreneurs and workers. I normal-
ize the measure of entrepreneurs to 1 and the measure of workers by λ. I interpret λ as the
worker-entrepreneur ratio. There is a continuum of individuals for each type, indexed by
i and j, respectively. Each worker is endowed with
1
λ
unit of time so that the aggregate
labor endowment is 1. I denote ut as instantaneous utility; each agent maximizes her
expected lifetime utility subject to her own budget constraint and borrowing constraint.
The aggregate productivity zt affects the production of each firm in the economy and
follows an AR(1) process
log zt+1 = ρz log zt + 
z
t+1, (2.1)
where zt+1 is normally distributed, 
z
t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2z), and the autoregressive parameter
ρz ∈ [0, 1).
2.2.2 Entrepreneurs
I assume that entrepreneurs only care about consumption. I specify a CRRA utility
function u(cit) =
(cit)
1−γ
1−γ , where γ denotes the degree of risk aversion. Each entrepreneur
owns a private firm. At t, an entrepreneur can invest capital kit+1 in the firm owned by
herself, but not in other private firms; she can buy or sell riskfree government bonds bit+1
as an alternative financial asset. Entrepreneurs do not work and receive asset gains as
the unique source of income. rit and Rt denote the return to her firm, and the interest
rate of bonds, respectively, while τat , the capital tax rate. The effective wealth consists of
gross income from capital and bond holdings net of taxation. The budget constraint and
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nonnegativity constraints are
cit + k
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 = [(1− τat )(rit − δ) + 1]kit + [(1− τat )(Rt − 1) + 1]bit, (2.2)
cit ≥ 0 and kit+1 ≥ 0.
Entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow in the bond market but the borrowing amount has
to fulfill the No-Ponzi condition
lim
T→∞
Et
bit+T
T−1∏
s=0
[(1− τat+s)(Rt+s − 1) + 1]
= 0. (2.3)
2.2.3 Firms
Each firm hires labor in a competitive labor market, employs its owner’s capital and
produces consumption goods. I name the firm run by the entrepreneur i also with i. I
assume the neoclassical production technology
yit = F (k
i
t, n
i
t, A
i
t) = (A
i
t)
α(kit)
α(nit)
1−α,
which exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to k and n. The firm-level pro-
ductivity specific to firm i, Ait, affects the final output y
i
t. Particularly, A
i
t consists
of two components, an idiosyncratic production risk eit and aggregate productivity zt:
logAit = log zt −
σ2e,t
2
+ eit, where e
i
t is independently and identically distributed among
firms and across time while zt captures the business cycle. The idiosyncratic risk, e
i
t, is
modelled as a normal, eit ∼ N (0, σ2e,t), where σ2e,t represents the variance of idiosyncratic
investment risks at t, which may vary across periods following σ2e,t = σ
2
e exp(−η log zt).
η > 0 denotes the response of volatility to the cycle. Bloom et al (2014) measure the
dispersion of TFP shocks for a panel of plants and find that the volatility of firm-specific
productivity rises during the recession. The idiosyncratic risk captures the position of a
specific firm ranked by the firm-level productivity. The correction term, −σ
2
e,t
2
, renders
the average productivity of private firms equivalent to the aggregate productivity. I define
the profit of firm i as the firm revenue net of labor costs
piit(k
i
t, n
i
t, A
i
t) = y
i
t − wtnit,
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where wt represents the wage rate at t. The competitive labor market ensures a univer-
sal wage rate in each period and the wage depends on the aggregate productivity and
aggregate allocations.
The assumption of i.i.d idiosyncratic investment risks may seem restrictive. Never-
theless, it is necessary for tractability. Also, it may not be that unrealistic given that
DeBacker et al (2013) find that business income is much less persistent than labor income
and it is characterized by higher probabilities of extreme upward or downward mobil-
ity. For instance, conditional on leaving the starting business income decile, a household
faces a 52% probability of moving to either of the two immediately adjacent deciles over
a year. More strikingly, households starting at the lowest decile of the business income
distribution face a 12% probability of transitioning to decile 8 or higher, whereas the
corresponding probability is essentially zero for labor income. Hence, business income
may transition from low to high amounts within a relatively short time and i.i.d shock is
a reasonable abstraction from the fact.
2.2.4 Workers
Worker j has preferences on consumption, which is specified as u(cjt) =
(cjt )
1−γ
1−γ . I assume
that a worker shares the same curvature of consumption as an entrepreneur. Workers
supply their labor in the competitive labor market, work in firms owned by entrepreneurs
and consume all of their earnings in the manner of hand-to-mouth agents. This is not
unrealistic given that quite a number of households hardly own any wealth other than
a house. Workers provide identical working hours but differ in their labor efficiency ejt ,
which is independently and identically distributed across workers. A worker’s personal
labor income depends on idiosyncratic labor efficiency and the wage rate. A worker is
taxed by a proportional labor tax rate, τnt . The assumption of hand-to-mouth implies that
the aggregate consumption and income for workers do not depend on the distribution of
workers. I assume that idiosyncratic labor efficiency follows a persistent stochastic process,
log ejt+1 = ρw log e
j
t + 
j
t+1, (2.4)
where ρw ∈ [0, 1) denotes the autocorrelation of labor efficiency and jt+1 is normally
distributed, jt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2w).
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The budget constraint for worker j is
cjt = (1− τnt )wt
1
λ
ejt . (2.5)
2.2.5 Government
Government spending, gt, is assumed to be exogenous, following an AR(1) process.
log gt+1 = (1− ρg) log g¯ + ρg log gt + gt+1, (2.6)
where the steady state level of government consumption is g¯, the autoregressive parameter
ρg ∈ [0, 1) and gt+1 is normally distributed, gt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2g).
Each period the government finances government spending by levying the proportional
taxes {τnt , τat } and issuing bonds {Bt+1}.∫
i
τat [(r
i
t − δ)kit + (Rt − 1)bit] +
∫
j
τnt wt
1
λ
ejt +Bt+1 = gt +RtBt, (2.7)
where Bt+1 denotes the total amount of bonds issued at t and paid off at t+ 1. I assume
that the government does not distinguish the gains from risky assets and from riskfree
assets so that it taxes the asset income at the same rate. In this paper, I intend to analyze
the optimal policy of capital taxation and debt conditional on the long-run levels, or the
effect on the social welfare of cyclical properties of taxation and debt. Thus I assume
that fiscal policy τat and Bt+1 are functions of log-deviation of output, indicating that the
government adjusts its policy over the cycle,
log
(
τat
τ¯a
)
= mY τ log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
; (2.8)
log
(
Bt+1
B¯
)
= ρB log
(
Bt
B¯
)
+mY B log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
. (2.9)
τ¯a represents the steady state level of tax rate, Y¯ denotes the steady state value of
output and B¯ shows the steady state level of debt. mY τ and mY B are two coefficients
governing the responses of current tax rates and debt to output fluctuations, respectively.
ρB denotes the autoregressive property of government debt
1. For instance, the government
1I set the autoregressive specification of debt because the government has to stabilize the debt holding.
As for tax policy, I choose a simple version of Leeper (1991)’s specification to facilitate my study.
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taxes more capital income and issues more government bonds during recessions if mY τ < 0
and mY B < 0. To sum up, the government sets the rules of debt and capital income tax,
and applies labor tax to balance the budget.
2.2.6 Timing
Every period aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic risks first hit the economy. The govern-
ment then announces fiscal policy based on the current state. After observing the shocks
and policy, workers supply labor while the firm optimally chooses the demand of labor.
The firm takes labor and predetermined capital as inputs to produce. The entrepreneur
consumes, accumulates capital and purchases bonds after she receives income from in-
terest and bond payment, and pays taxes. The worker consumes all the after-tax labor
income.
2.2.7 Stationarity
The current model would imply a nonstationary distribution of wealth and income. I add
an exogenous death probability, Prd, to all entrepreneurs to guarantee limited income by
entrepreneurs. Specifically the death shock is assumed to happen after every entrepreneur
makes her own decision each time. Some entrepreneurs die while the same number of
newborns enter into the economy. Every newborn inherits the average amount of risky
and riskfree assets previously owned by the dead. I will show in the later section that
entrepreneurs make saving and portfolio choices independent of the income distribution,
only as functions of the aggregate state. Hence this assumption does not change the
original choices before death and facilitates the computation.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
Denote Kt, Bt, zt, gt as the aggregate state St, and k
i
t, b
i
t, e
i
t as the individual state for
entrepreneurs sit.
Definition. An equilibrium is a stochastic sequence of prices {wt(St), Rt+1(St)}∞t=0, a
stochastic sequence of individual allocations {cit(sit;St), kit+1(sit;St), bit+1(sit;St)}∞t=0, i ∈
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[0, 1], for entrepreneurs, {cjt(ejt ;St), njt(ejt ;St)}∞t=0, j ∈ (1, λ+1], for workers, {yit(sit;St), nit(sit;St)}∞t=0
for firms, and aggregate allocations {CEt (St), CWt (St), Kt+1(St), Yt(St)}∞t=0, such that
(1) Given prices {wt(St), Rt+1(St)}∞t=0, fiscal policy {τnt (St), τat (St), Bt+1(St)} and the
distribution of initial assets ki0 and b
i
0, every entrepreneur i and every worker j maxi-
mize their respective lifetime utility by choosing {cit(sit;St), kit+1(sit;St), bit+1(sit;St)}∞t=0 and
{cjt(ejt ;St), njt(ejt ;St)}∞t=0, and every firm i maximizes its profit by choosing {nit(sit;St), yit(sit;St)}∞t=0.
(2) Aggregation: CEt (St) =
∫
i
cit(s
i
t;St), Yt(St) =
∫
i
yit(s
i
t;St), Kt+1(St) =
∫
i
kit+1(s
i
t;St)
and CWt (St) =
∫
j
cjt(e
j
t ;St) for all t.
(3) Labor market clearing:
∫
i
nit(s
i
t;St) =
∫
j
njt(e
j
t ;St)e
j
t for all t.
(4) Bond market clearing:
∫
i
bit+1(s
i
t;St) = Bt+1(St) for all t.
(5) Goods market clearing: CEt (St)+C
W
t (St)+Kt+1(St)+gt = Yt(St)+(1−δ)Kt(St−1).
(6) The government budget constraint holds given capital tax and bond specifications
for all t, i.e. (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) hold.
For the expository purpose, I will mostly drop the state in each variable for the rest
of my paper and only use the expression with the state when it is necessary.
2.3.2 Individual Behavior
Because the firm chooses employment, nit, after observing the shock and after determin-
ing the capital stock, nit is the only control variable to maximize the profit. By constant
returns to scale, optimal firm employment and profit are linear in capital, as in Angele-
tos (2007):
nit =
(
1− α
wt
) 1
α
Aitk
i
t = n(A
i
t, wt)k
i
t, (2.10)
piit =
α(1− α
wt
) 1
α
−1
Ait
 kit = r(Ait, wt)kit. (2.11)
It indicates that the firm experiences linear returns to investment by adjusting its employ-
ment linearly to the capital stock. Notice that the return to a private firm i, rit = r(A
i
t, wt),
is expressed by the firm specific productivity, Ait, and the economy-wide wage which can
be further expressed by the aggregate productivity and total capital stock.
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Denote the effective wealth of entrepreneur i in period t by
xit ≡
[
(1− τat )(r(Ait, wt)− δ) + 1
]
kit + [(1− τat )(Rt − 1) + 1]bit.
I rewrite the budget constraint as cit + k
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 = x
i
t.
I characterize the entrepreneur’s behavior following Angeletos (2007) in Lemma, whose
proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma. Given prices and fiscal policy, optimal consumption, capital stock in the private
firm, and bond holdings are linear in effective wealth as shown in (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14);
cit = νtx
i
t, (2.12)
kit+1 = (1− νt)φtxit, (2.13)
bit+1 = (1− νt)(1− φt)xit, (2.14)
where the marginal propensity to consume out of effective wealth, νt, and the share of
private equity in the portfolio, φt, are two stochastic coefficients, depending solely on the
current aggregate states, St, and satisfying
φt = arg max
φ∈[0,1]
CEt
{
φt[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt)[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}
,
(2.15)
ν−γt = βs(1− νt)−γEt
{
ν−γt+1{φt[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1]+
+(1− φt)[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]}1−γ
}
,
(2.16)
where CE represents the certainty equivalent of an entrepreneur.2
Define the value function for entrepreneurs as V (xit) which is given by
V (xit) =
ν−γt (x
i
t)
1−γ
1− γ . (2.17)
The entrepreneur makes the optimal portfolio choice, φt, by maximizing risk-adjusted
portfolio returns, expressed by the certainty equivalent, CE, of the portfolio return given
the saving choice, (1 − νt). If the return to capital is surely greater than the return to
bonds, she will invest all her savings on capital. The uncertainty of capital return, though,
2I denote βs = β(1− Prd)
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induces her to divide her investment on both assets, which ensures an interior point of
portfolio decisions. The current specification of tax policy implies that a change in the
capital tax rate fails to directly influence the portfolio choice since both types of assets
are taxed at the same rate. Nonetheless, the capital tax rate distorts the saving choice,
indirectly affecting asset returns and the composition of portfolio. Given the portfolio
choice, the entrepreneur chooses the marginal propensity to consume according to the
intertemporal condition to maximize the lifetime utility. Because of i.i.d idiosyncratic
investment risks and homogeneity of the production and utility functions, entrepreneurs
make the saving and portfolio decisions independent of income distribution. Hence the
marginal propensity to consume and the risky-asset-over-wealth ratio only depend on the
aggregate state.
The hand-to-mouth worker consumes all her after-tax labor income every period. So
the consumption path is completely characterized by the budget constraint of workers.
2.3.3 General Equilibrium
Recall that aggregate productivity zt and idiosyncratic risks e
i
t are orthogonal. Aggregate
labor demand and firm profit are given by NDt = n˜(wt, zt)Kt and Πt = r˜(wt, zt)Kt, where
n˜(wt, zt) ≡
∫ ∞
−∞
n(Ait, wt) dF (e
i
t) =
(
1− α
wt
) 1
α
zt,
and
r˜(wt, zt) ≡
∫ ∞
−∞
r(Ait, wt) dF (e
i
t) = α
(
1− α
wt
) 1
α
−1
zt.
F (·) represents the distribution function of i.i.d idiosyncratic investment risks. Thus
n˜(wt, zt) denotes the average labor employed by a firm and r˜(wt, zt), the average capital
return to a private firm. Let NSt =
∫
j
1
λ
ejt = 1 represent aggregate labor supply; labor-
market clearing requires that NDt = n˜(wt, zt)Kt = 1. The wage is expressed as wt =
w(Kt, zt) = (1 − α) (ztKt)α. Further algebra shows that rt = r˜(wt, zt) = αzαt Kα−1t . I
write aggregate output as Yt = Πt + wtN
S
t = rtKt + wt = z
α
t K
α
t . Aggregate allocations
are also independent of the wealth distribution because consumption, bond holdings,
and private investment are linear in individual wealth and idiosyncratic risks in every
period are i.i.d across firms and periods. The general equilibrium is determined by the
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following equations, where I drop the determination of zt and gt as they are assumed
to be exogenous. I denote CEt as the aggregate consumption assigned to the group of
entrepreneurs and CWt , to the group of workers.
CEt + C
W
t +Kt+1 + gt = z
α
t K
α
t + (1− δ)Kt, (2.18)
CWt = (1− τnt )wt, (2.19)
CEt = νt{[(1− τat )(rt − δ) + 1]Kt + [(1− τat )(Rt − 1) + 1]Bt}, (2.20)
Kt+1 = (1− νt)φt{[(1− τat )(rt − δ) + 1]Kt + [(1− τat )(Rt − 1) + 1]Bt}, (2.21)
Bt+1 = (1− νt)(1− φt){[(1− τat )(rt − δ) + 1]Kt + [(1− τat )(Rt − 1) + 1]Bt}, (2.22)
These five equations, together with (2.15) and (2.16), solve for seven variables CEt ,
CWt , Kt+1, Bt+1, Rt+1, νt and φt, given the current aggregate state and fiscal policy.
2.3.4 Computation Process
The framework allows me to separate the computation of aggregate variables and income
distribution. First, I apply the second-order approximation to simulate a time series of
equilibrium at the aggregate level over the business cycle starting from the steady state.
I am able to accomplish it because, economically speaking, every entrepreneur makes
exactly identical saving and portfolio decisions regardless of their individual wealth. In
another word, I can always find a representative entrepreneur to study the behavior of
all entrepreneurs. Then I divide aggregate allocations into the individual level. The
next period’s capital and bonds of entrepreneur i can be calculated as a product of saving
choice, portfolio choice and effective wealth as (2.13) and (2.14). The first two components
are obtained from the time series of general equilibrium. I separate the last part into
idiosyncratic capital returns, interest rate of bonds and capital and bonds stock held from
last period. The time series of equilibrium contains the values of interest rate and the
average capital returns, then from (35) in Appendix B we get idiosyncratic capital returns
by inputting a stochastic process of idiosyncratic risks. Thus the amount of assets forms
a recursion given asset prices in the aggregate level and idiosyncratic risks. Workers share
the total labor income determined by general equilibrium with different labor efficiency.
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I simulate 2000 entrepreneurs and, as a consequence, 10000 is the number of workers.
I allocate equally the steady state level of capital and bonds to 2000 entrepreneurs as
the initial point. Since individual capital returns are idiosyncratic to entrepreneurs, lucky
entrepreneurs accumulate more and more assets so that the gap of capital income rises
over time. Yet the assumption of random death prevents infinite inequality. I record the
income of every agent, including entrepreneurs and workers, order all values and then
compute quantile statistics and the like. I run a simulation with 2500 periods and drop
the first 1500 periods to guarantee stability.
2.4 Business Cycle Statistics of the Income Distribu-
tion
This section starts from calibration. Then the section investigates the behavior of aggre-
gate variables over the business cycle. It further shows that the model, with aggregate
shocks, can mimic the income distribution and its cyclicality at a small computational
cost. The model matches the dynamics of the income distribution shown in the data
qualitatively for most the quantiles.
2.4.1 Calibration
Numerical analysis is needed to evaluate the effect of idiosyncratic investment risks on
the steady state. This subsection first describes the details of calibrating the model.
I assume that a period in my model corresponds to a year. I use some parameter
values which are common in the literature of business cycle: The capital share of output,
α, is assumed to be 0.36; the depreciation rate, δ, 0.08.
The probability of death, Prd, for entrepreneurs is interpreted to match the working
lifetime of an entrepreneur or a private firm. However, the statistic is unclear and hard to
measure. I assume the probability of death to be 0.025 for an expected working lifetime
of 40 years. I then calibrate the discount rate so that the subjective discount rate of
entrepreneurs after considering death produces a realistic capital-output ratio, 2.7, as in
the US. I assume the worker-entrepreneur ratio as 5 to match the estimation of business
owners and self-employed in the US reported by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).3
3The value seems much higher than the estimated proportion of hand-to-mouth workers. For instance,
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The choice of risk aversion degree matters for my study, especially when I evaluate
fiscal policy. The baseline calibration sets the risk aversion degree equal to 2. The reason
is that to assess fiscal policy requires the welfare comparison and the value is commonly
applied in the literature on welfare.
I apply the effective marginal tax rate of the US computed by Devereux et al. (2008)
as the capital tax rate in my model. I take the mean of these rates from 1979 to 2005
and the value is 22.19%, which is close to the capital tax rate used by Chari et al. (1994).
I pick the labor income tax rate to balance the government budget. In the benchmark
calibration, I set the steady state levels of debt as 60 percent of output and government
consumption as 18 percent of output, both of which depict the U.S. situation before the
recent crisis.
It is hard to find an exact measurement of idiosyncratic investment risks in the em-
pirical studies. DeBacker et al. (2012) find that the standard deviation of uninsurable
idiosyncratic income risks from privately held businesses accounts for 45 percent of the av-
erage business income.4 Therefore I calibrate my model to match their finding; specifically
the cross sectional standard deviation of individual firm’s return is 45% of the average
return. Notice that a number of macroeconomic studies, such as Sandri (2014), apply the
volatility of firms’ returns as 50% of the mean return, thus I assure my calibration close
to their choice and my results comparable.
I set the autocorrelation of idiosyncratic labor income risks equal to 0.9989 and the
standard deviation, 0.0166 using the estimation of Storesletten et al. (2004).
Kaplan et al. (2014) define a household to be hand-to-mouth in a period if it consumes all its cash-on-
hand for the period and carries zero liquid wealth between the current and next period. They conclude
that on average, 31 percent of US households are hand-to-mouth from 1989 to 2010. The assumption
of hand-to-mouth workers in this paper aims to shut down saving from workers who face labor income
risks to simplify the analysis and the computation. Since the model does not involve housing, I focus on
the individuals who have no non-housing wealth defined by net worth. About 60% of households in the
US own no wealth other than their home according to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances. Although
my choice of the worker/entrepreneur ratio still overstates the composition of hand-to-mouth workers in
this sense, I have a reason as follows. The 2016 poll by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public
Affairs Research uncovers that two thirds of Americans would have difficulty coming up with the money
to cover a 1000-dollar emergency. In a 2015 study by the Federal Reserve, 47 percent of respondents
said they either could not cover even a 400-dollar emergency expense or would have to sell something
or borrow money. This paper mainly investigates the fluctuations of income distribution in the business
cycle. When a sufficiently negative shock happens, individuals probably face a much larger loss than 1000
dollars so that the assumption of more than 80 percent of hand-to-mouth workers in my model does not
exaggerate much the situation of US citizens over the business cycle.
4They employ individual income tax returns data from the Internal Revenue Service over 23 years,
compute for each household the time series standard deviation of its business income normalized by the
household’s average total income over time, and then combine those business income ”coefficients of
variation” into one cross sectional average.
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The calibration for the exogenous technology process and government spending follows
Chari et al. (1994). I use the FRED dataset and the OECD tax dataset to pin down
the responses of capital tax and debt to output in the above specified fiscal policy. I
regress debt on the HP-filtered log of output and lagged debt following the fiscal policy
specification. I estimate the response of capital tax rate to output deviation with a
similar method except that the regressor only contains HP-filtered log of output. Worth
to mention, the estimated tax policy has little correlation with output. Meanwhile, the
government reduces debt in the expansion and vice versa.
Recall that I correlate the volatility of idiosyncratic investment risks with aggregate
productivity, eit ∼ N (0, σ2e exp(−η log zt). I calibrate the sensitivity of the variance of
idiosyncratic investment risks to aggregate productivity shocks, η, to match the empirical
finding of Bloom et al. (2016) that plant-level TFP shocks increased in variance by 76%
during the recent recession (2008 to 2009) compared to the years before the recession
(2005 to 2006). I plug the deviation of the logarithm of TFP from the trend in 2006 and
in 2009 into the expression of the variance of idiosyncratic investment risks and back out
the value of η. All above parameter values for the benchmark calibration are included in
Table 2.1.
2.4.2 Cyclical Behavior of Aggregate Variables in General Equi-
librium
Before presenting the results on the income distribution, I first show the cyclical behav-
ior of aggregate variables in general equilibrium to better understand the mechanism of
countercyclical idiosyncratic investment risks. Figure 2.1 plots impulse response func-
tions of selected variables after one-standard-deviation negative productivity shock hits
the economy for the baseline model, for the model with constant idiosyncratic investment
risks (η = 0), and for the model without idiosyncratic risks. Particularly, I emphasize the
marginal propensity to save, (1− ν), and the portfolio choice, φ, since these two variables
summarize the key property of the entire equilibrium allocations and prices.
The marginal propensity to save, (1 − ν), rises after the adverse shock only in the
baseline model. Investors tend to save more assets in the recession because highly coun-
tercyclical idiosyncratic investment risks amplify the precautionary saving motives. In
addition, they invest more in safe assets so that the capital share in the portfolio, φ,
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Table 2.1: Calibration for the benchmark case
Parameters Values Descriptions
α 0.36 capital share of output
β 0.98 subjective discount rate
Prd 0.025 probability of death for entrepreneurs
δ 0.08 depreciation rate
γ 2 risk aversion degree
b¯ 60% output steady state level of bonds
g¯ 18% output steady state level of government consumption
τ¯a 22.19% steady state asset income tax rate
σe 45% average return standard deviation of idiosyncratic risks
λ 5 worker/entrepreneur ratio
ρw 0.9989 autocorrelation of labor efficiency
σw 0.0166 cross-sectional standard deviation of labor income
η 11.10 sensitivity of the variance of idiosyncratic
production risks to productivity shocks
ρz 0.81 autocorrelation of technology process
σz 0.05 standard deviation of technology shock
ρg 0.89 autocorrelation of government spending
σg 0.07 standard deviation of government spending shock
ρB 0.84 autocorrelation of government debt
mY B -0.62 response of debt to output gap
mY τ -0.077 response of tax to output gap
shows procyclicality, which causes procyclical capital stock.
The cyclical behavior of interest rate is the consequence of the movement of govern-
ment bonds’ supply and demand over the cycle. Agents demand more riskfree assets in
the bust; meanwhile, the government supplies more bonds according to the policy specifi-
cation. A smaller increase in supply relative to the change in demand results in a higher
equilibrium price of government bonds, or equivalently, a lower interest rate, especially
with countercyclical idiosyncratic investment risks. The average return to capital shows
an identical pattern in all three cases, following the change in productivity. With coun-
tercyclical idiosyncratic risks, equity premium increases in the second period and remains
positive for around 30 periods in the recession, although the average return to capital and
interest rate both decline.
Entrepreneurs expect a higher return to capital compared to bonds so that in the
baseline model, the capital share in the portfolio declines less than the other two models
at the early stage after shock. Yet it recovers to the steady state more slowly because
high variance of idiosyncratic investment risks in the recession is persistent.
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2.4.3 Income Inequality: Level
The income of an entrepreneur i is defined as the asset gains, I it = (r
i
t−δ)kit+(Rt−1)bit, as
Castan˜eda et al (1998) do, while the income of a worker j is the labor income,
1
λ
wte
j
t . My
model does a decent job in generating income equality as the data show. For comparison,
I take the statistics of the US income distribution from Current Population Survey and
compute the means of income shares over time. Next column reports the means of income
shares of different income groups obtained from the simulation. My model fits the data
in the sense that it generates considerable income inequality although the rich obtain less
income and the poor share more compared with the data.
Table 2.2: Income Inequality: Level
Quantiles Share of income Share of income
(Data) (Model)
1st (bottom 20%) 4.1% 6.96%
2nd (20-40%) 10.3% 14.72%
3rd (40-60%) 16.4% 18.23%
4th (60-80%) 23.9% 22.51%
5th (80-95%) 27.0% 22.40%
Top 5% 18.4% 15.18%
Ratios Value (Data) Value (Model)
95/50 ratio 3.29 2.08
50/20 ratio 2.40 1.42
All the values of income shares are means computed using correspond-
ing data from CPS from 1947 to 2013. CPS provides the statistics of
households only since 1967 so I pick up the income share of families
from 1947 to 1966.
Entrepreneurs account for the majority in the top income group and for over one
third of agents in the bottom as shown in Table 2.3. It follows the dispersed distribution
of idiosyncratic investment risks. Most entrepreneurs are rich in the model, yet some
unlucky ones find themselves in the low income groups. Since entrepreneurs in the bench-
mark calibration are in line with the definition of business owners and self-employed, the
simulation generates poor entrepreneurs as in reality since part of self-employed have low
income. It indicates that income inequality in the baseline model is obtained by modelling
entrepreneurs with relatively high idiosyncratic investment risks, which is confirmed by
other research, such as Benhabib et al. (2011) and Nirei and Aoki (2016). In addition,
I assume hand-to-mouth workers, which creates heterogeneity in the behaviors of agents
and leads to inequality.
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Table 2.3: Proportion of En-
trepreneurs
Quantiles Model
1st (bottom 20%) 34.04%
2nd (20-40%) 6.06%
3rd (40-60%) 5.99%
4th (60-80%) 7.91%
5th (80-95%) 16.67%
Top 5% 67.34%
2.4.4 Income Inequality: Cyclical Behavior
Table 2.4 reports the correlations with output of the income shares owned by income
groups in the data and in my model. I choose the same data from CPS as for the level
of income inequity and choose seasonally adjusted real GDP measured by 2009 billion
dollars during 1948-2013. I detrend the shares, ratios and the log of real GDP by HP-
filter and calculate the correlations. For the model, I pick the time series of income shares
of the corresponding income groups and obtain the correlations with the output over the
business cycle.
Table 2.4: Correlation of Income
Shares with Output
Income groups Data Model
bottom 20% 0.29 0.80
20-40% 0.30 0.96
40-60% 0.15 0.87
60-80% -0.19 0.66
80-95% -0.44 -0.36
Top 5% 0.07 -0.86
Ratios Data Model
95/50 ratio -0.24 -0.86
50/20 ratio -0.06 -0.82
All the values of income shares use cor-
responding data from CPS from 1947
to 2013. CPS provides the statistics of
households only since 1967 so I pick up
the income share of families from 1947
to 1966.
My model with the baseline calibration qualitatively matches correlation with output
of income shares except the top 5% group and the 60-80% group although the model still
differs from the data quantitatively. My model overstates the procyclicality for groups
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from the bottom to 60% and the countercyclicality for 80-95%.
I wonder why my model presents such quantitative behaviors of the income distribution
over the cycle. To uncover the mechanism, I build up two more statistics to measure the
impact of business cycle on individual income: coefficients of variation of t + 1’s income
for entrepreneurs and workers given t’s information, Coef.Var.t(I
i
t+1) and Coef.Var.t(I
j
t+1).
These two statistics aim to show how an aggregate shock at t+1 affects t+1’s income for
agents who expect it at t. Notice that for simplicity I do not consider the death risk in
the subsequent discussion of mechanism since to add death does not affect any qualitative
result. I express the two statistics as follows, whose derivation lies in Appendix C.
Coef.Var.t(I
i
t+1) =
φtαz
αρz
t K
α−1
t+1
√
exp
[
σ2e exp(−ηρz log zt) +
1
2
(2α− ησ2e)2σ2z
]
− exp (α2σ2z)
φtαz
αρz
t exp
(
1
2
α2σ2z
)
Kα−1t+1 + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)
.
(2.23)
Coef.Var.t(I
j
t+1) =
√
exp (α2σ2z + σ
2
w)− 1. (2.24)
The conditional coefficient of variation of workers’ next period income is constant. It
results from the assumption of hand-to-mouth workers. The wage inherits the cyclical
behavior from the output; in particular, its coefficient of variation equates the one of
output. Idiosyncratic labor income risks with constant variance enlarge the total variance
of workers’ income so that eventually the summed volatility appears in the coefficient of
variation, indicating the function of both aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic labor income
risks on the cross-sectional disparity of workers’ income.
When the high productivity is realized, the wage rate rises. The mean labor income
become higher. The lucky workers in the high state experience a larger increase in their
income while the unlucky workers see a smaller increase or even a decrease in the income,
depending on the size of idiosyncratic risks. Indeed, almost all workers are highly likely
to obtain higher income, though the extent varies, in the high state because idiosyncratic
labor income risks have a much smaller dispersion than aggregate shocks in the benchmark
simulation. The low productivity produces opposite results compared to the preceding
ones. Since the coefficient of variation of workers’ income remains constant over the cycle,
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the difference of income in the low state for rich and poor workers remains the same as
in the high state. Summarizing both states I conclude that income of all workers shows
procyclical behavior.
The conditional coefficient of variation of entrepreneurs’ income over the cycle looks
more complicated. I start from the discussion on the denominator or, roughly speaking,
the conditional mean of income. Idiosyncratic investment risks, as they are assumed to be
i.i.d, exert no effect on next period’s expected income. Only aggregate shocks influence
the conditional expectation through the channel of returns to assets. When a negative
shock happens at t, persistence implies probably low productivity next period, resulting
in smaller share of capital in the portfolio, lower capital stock and lower expected returns
to capital. As a consequence, the conditional expected income diminishes during the
recession.
When investigating the cyclical property of conditional standard deviation, recall that
I assign a positive value to the response of volatility to aggregate productivity, η. An
adverse aggregate shock causes an increase in the value inside the root operation while
the product of other terms outside the root operation goes down. Therefore, the expression
cannot easily judge the moving direction of the whole nominator and of the fraction facing
an aggregate shock.
Instead, I analyze the variation of entrepreneurs’ income over the cycle numerically by
considering three cases: when the economy is in the steady state and when the economy
suffers a negative and a positive shock. Figure 2.2 plots the cumulative distribution func-
tion for entrepreneurs when one standard deviation of negative or positive aggregate shock
hits the economy and when the economy stays in steady state. The low state enlarges the
income gap between rich and poor entrepreneurs since idiosyncratic investment risks rise
in the recession. The increased individual difference magnifies the damage of low state
to the poor, and reduces it to the rich. The expansion witnesses a similar change but
with an opposite direction and a smaller scale. Thus the possibility of obtaining lower
income in the expansion is much less than that of higher income in the recession. To sum
up, the income share of rich entrepreneurs exhibits countercyclicality while that of poor
entrepreneurs shows procyclicality.
When I add up the income distribution of workers and entrepreneurs, the bottom
income group consists of poor workers and poor entrepreneurs. Thus, income share of poor
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agents must show procyclicality. Entrepreneurs account for a large number of top earners,
so rich agents in my model see countercyclical income share. The sign of correlations of
income shares in the middle groups is indeterminate, but less countercyclical than the top
end and less procyclical than the bottom end. It also explains why cyclicality of income
shares generally decreases with the income.
2.5 Fiscal Policy Experiments
This section explores if heterogeneity impacts the choice of fiscal policy from a norma-
tive perspective. The government, fixing the steady state level of fiscal policy, adjusts
the cyclicality of policy instruments to maximize the welfare of different agents. I put
emphasis on the time to tax capital more and the time to issue more debt. I find a
welfare conflict between entrepreneurs and workers. Under the baseline calibration, the
government should tax capital more and issue more debt in the recession. However, the
welfare conflict implies that the government may cut the capital income tax rate in the
recession if it gives more welfare weight to workers, which overturns the finding of Chari
et al. (1994).
2.5.1 Objective and Method of Policy Experiments
As the welfare criterion, I adopt the ex-ante utilitarian social utility in which the social
planner sums up the life-time individual utility across agents,
USP0 =
∫
i
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
(cit)
1−γ
1− γ +
∫
j
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
(cjt)
1−γ
1− γ =
∫
i
V (xi0) +
∫
j
V (xj0).
I denote the value function of entrepreneurs and workers as
∫
i
V (xi0) and
∫
j
V (xj0), respec-
tively. Recall that the value function of entrepreneurs is showed as (2.17),
V (xi0) =
ν−γ0 x
1−γ
i,0
1− γ .
Given that the initial conditions of capital and bond holdings are identical under different
policy specifications, the value function of entrepreneurs maps one-to-one to the marginal
propensity to consume. Moreover, since the risk aversion degree, γ, is larger than one
60 CHAPTER 2. WHEN TO TAX CAPITAL
in my welfare analysis, the life-time utility for entrepreneurs increases with the marginal
propensity to consume. In another word, more consumption conditional on a certain
available wealth heightens the welfare of entrepreneurs.
Besides, Appendix D derives the value function of workers and I replicate the result:
V (xj0) = λ
γ
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{
[(1− τnt )wt]1−γ
1− γ
}
exp
(
σ2w(1− γ)2
2(1− ρ2w)
)
.
The government searches for the time to tax capital more and to issue more debt
by changing the responses of tax rate and of debt to output, and comparing the social
welfare. The economy starts from a fixed state at which state variables are evaluated
at their long-run means with baseline calibration. Thus the government does consider
the effect of a transition from the baseline policy to a new one on the welfare in this
exercise. I compute the consumption equivalent variation in percentage of the aggregate
life-time utility across entrepreneurs, across workers and across agents, as the response
of tax rate to output and the response of debt to output range from -2 to 2 and from
-1 to 1, respectively, under the baseline calibration of other parameters previously used
to produce the dynamics of income distribution. The base to compute the consumption
equivalent variation is the life-time utility under the baseline policy to match the policy
data, for each type of agents and the counterpart of social welfare.
2.5.2 Welfare Conflict between Entrepreneurs and Workers
Figure 2.3a shows the welfare change in terms of the consumption equivalent variation
of entrepreneurs, workers and all agents under different capital tax policy when the debt
policy is fixed. Figure 2.3b, instead, depicts the welfare change of different groups under
various debt policy if the government fixes the capital tax policy. They both manifest that
entrepreneurs and workers favor different policy. In the recession, entrepreneurs prefer a
low debt level and a high capital tax rate while workers, a high debt level and a low capital
tax rate. Figure 2.8 in Appendix E plots the welfare change if the government simulta-
neously chooses two fiscal policy instruments. It also indicates a welfare conflict between
entrepreneurs and workers under various combinations of fiscal policy instruments.
To better compare the effect of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, I pick the combinations
of the responses of capital tax rate and debt to output which maximize the welfare of
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Figure 2.3: Welfare Change of Diﬀerent Groups
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entrepreneurs, workers and all agents, respectively. Table 2.5 reports the welfare change
of different agents and the change in aggregate variables under three policy combinations.
All the values are percentage changes compared to the counterparts under the benchmark
calibration.
If the government aims to maximize the welfare of entrepreneurs, a high capital tax
rate and a low debt level should be chosen in the recession. The mean level of bonds
rises while the average capital tax rate declines compared to the benchmark calibration.
More government bonds give entrepreneurs insurance and crowd out capital, yet less tax
burden encourages entrepreneurs to invest more in capital. The combination of policy
turns out to slightly raise capital stock, which furthermore pushes up the wage. The
mean consumption of entrepreneurs increases due to less tax burden and higher asset
income. The government budget balance requires a higher average labor tax rate, which
causes a decrease in consumption of workers.
The volatility of consumption of entrepreneurs increases by more than 160% compared
to the baseline policy. Yet the standard deviation of consumption of entrepreneurs still
accounts for less than 5 % of the mean. For entrepreneurs, the increase in the mean
consumption outweighs the welfare loss from a higher volatility. Workers see less mean
consumption and a higher volatility. Thus, entrepreneurs are better off and workers are
worse off.
The policy combination that maximizes the welfare of workers features the debt neg-
atively correlated with output and the capital tax rate positively correlated with output.
Under this policy, the mean level of bonds diminishes while the average capital tax rate
increases. The distortionary capital income tax disincentivizes entrepreneurs to invest,
leading to lower average capital stock and a lower mean wage. The mean consumption of
entrepreneurs decreases after entrepreneurs are taxed more heavily and deprived of con-
siderable amount of riskfree assets. The current policy, however, results in higher mean
consumption of workers because they suffer less from labor taxation. Although the con-
sumption of workers varies over the cycle more than under the baseline policy, the mean
effect again dominates the fluctuation effect. Therefore, only workers are better off.
2.5.3 Time to Tax Capital and Increase Debt
Chari et al. (1994) investigate optimal fiscal policy in the business cycle. They find that
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the correlation of an optimal capital income tax rate with technology shock is negative
with uncontingent debt in their baseline model. In addition, when there is a negative
innovation to the technology shock or a positive innovation to government consumption,
there is a positive innovation in the tax on private assets. They argue that it is efficient
for these shocks which affect the government budget constraint to be absorbed mainly by
the tax on private assets.
The policy that maximizes the social welfare in my model features a 0.45 percentage-
point increase in the capital tax rate and a 0.37 percent increase in the debt level when
the output drops by one percent. The policy combination results in a low average level of
debt and a low average capital tax rate. Capital stock and wage increase by 0.44% and
0.14%, respectively, compared to the baseline policy. The policy also leads to a higher
labor tax rate. The entrepreneurs have more average consumption while workers have
slightly less consumption. The volatility of the consumption of entrepreneurs and workers
see opposite changes; in particular, the consumption of entrepreneurs fluctuates by a
much larger margin. The mean effect dominates the fluctuation effect for entrepreneurs.
The large decrease in the volatility of consumption of workers compensates partially the
negative effect of the reduced mean consumption. Therefore, entrepreneurs are better off
while workers are worse off; but compared to the policy preferred by entrepreneurs, the
welfare loss of workers is much smaller.
The result seems to confirm the finding of Chari et al. (1994). Yet the capital rate
under the policy combination maximazing social welfare increases in the recession less
than under the one favoring only entrepreneurs. It implies that considering workers’
welfare lowers the capital tax that should be levied in the bust. The utilitarian social
utility weighs less the equality compared to many other welfare criteria. The government
would specify a capital tax rule in which the rate increases little or even decreases in the
recession if the government puts sufficient emphasis on workers. Therefore, it is possible
that the government should cut the capital tax rate in the recession.
2.5.4 Impulse Responses of Aggregate Variables under Different
Policy
Figure 2.4 plots the impulse responses of aggregate variables to one-standard-deviation
negative aggregate productivity shock under the baseline calibration and the other three
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policy combinations optimizing entrepreneurs, workers and all agents, respectively.
The dynamics of fiscal policy instruments after a negative productivity shock differ
with different policy targets. The policy which maximizes the welfare of entrepreneurs
requires a low debt level while other policy specifications indicate higher debt than in the
normal time. The difference in the change of debt causes the qualitative disparity in the
change of portfolio choice. All four policy combinations discussed lead to higher marginal
propensity to save in the recession as a result of countercyclical investment risks. Only
under the policy maximizing entrepreneurs’ welfare do entrepreneurs hold more capital.
The equity premium increases, although the average return to capital and interest rate
both decline, because entrepreneurs tend to hold safe assets after confronting much higher
idiosyncratic investment risks in the recession. Generally speaking, the less debt when
the adverse shock hits, the more capital and output in the early stage after the shock.
However, the recovery of capital slows down and falls behind the counterparts under
other policy combinations because the average return to capital is lower. Entrepreneurs
see a lower level of consumption under each policy combination; among all them, the
entrepreneur-preferred policy pulls down consumption most and causes the slowest recov-
ery.
Low output and low wage result from low productivity. The labor tax rate rises
merely under the entrepreneur-preferred policy because under this policy the government
has to reduce the debt holding and the budget balance constraint requires higher tax
revenues. It lowers the consumption of workers more than other policy. Yet since the
policy maximizing entrepreneurs’ welfare also raises the capital stock in the first several
periods after the shock, output and wage recover fast. In addition, the labor tax rate
drops rapidly to even a lower level than the steady state. Thus, the consumption of
workers returns to the steady state within short periods.
2.6 Robustness Check
This section examines the robustness of the result of welfare conflict. First, the govern-
ment turns to only change the fiscal policy instruments that directly affect entrepreneurs.
Second, I let the volatility of idiosyncratic investment risks uncorrelated to the aggregate
productivity, σ2e,t = σ
2
e , and simulate the welfare of heterogeneous agents under different
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policy. Lastly, I shut down the idiosyncratic investment risks, σe,t = 0, to see its effect on
the welfare. The welfare conflict exists in the first exercise. Yet qualitatively the time to
tax capital income no longer incurs welfare conflicts between groups. The welfare conflict
disappears in the qualitative sense in the last two exercises.
2.6.1 Constant Labor Tax Rate and Consumption Tax on En-
trepreneurs
The above section indicates that the change of cyclical behavior of fiscal policy redis-
tributes resources between entrepreneurs and workers. Consequently, the welfare of en-
trepreneurs and workers witnesses different reactions. Since I use labor tax rate to balance
the government budget, if the government raises debt or lowers capital tax rate, labor tax
rate may have to rise, which directly lowers the consumption of workers. This direct
effect may outweigh the indirect effect of wage on the welfare of workers. This subsection
conducts an experiment in which the government levies a new consumption tax pointing
only to entrepreneurs so that the adjustment of capital income tax rate only influences
the welfare of workers through wage. The capital income tax and debt policy are regu-
lated according to policy specifications, (2.8) and (2.9), while keeping constant level of
labor tax rate but applying consumption tax rate to balance the government budget.
The policy prescription of capital income tax, debt and consumption tax directly affects
entrepreneurs’ welfare through saving and portfolio choices. Besides, the government no
longer taxes the income from riskfree assets, or government bonds, in this exercise. This
modification aims to see if the choice of policy may depend on tax deductions on certain
assets.
The government budget constraint now reads
∫
i
[
τ kt
(
rit − δ
)
kit + τ
c
t c
i
t
]
+
∫
j
τnwt
1
λ
ejt +Bt+1 = gt +RtBt, (2.25)
where τ ct represents consumption tax that varies over the cycle to balance the budget. Ap-
pendix F exhibits the solution to the modified entrepreneurs’ problem. The fundamental
result that saving and portfolio choices are independent of wealth distribution still holds.
The capital income tax, however, directly influences the portfolio choice since the tax
rate enters into the expression of certainty equivalent. I assume zero consumption tax in
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steady state so that the new model evaluated with the baseline parameter values matches
the same calibration targets as the previous model.
I find that the welfare conflict still occurs as shown in Figure 2.5. The only qualitative
difference in the preferences of fiscal policy lies in the choice on the cyclical property of
debt policy. Entrepreneurs prefer a low debt level in the recession while workers, instead,
prefer a slightly high debt policy. Workers, like entrepreneurs, favor a procyclical capital
tax policy, although the capital tax rate favored by workers rises in the recession less
than the one preferred by entrepreneurs. This is because a procyclical capital tax policy
engenders higher capital stock and thus higher wage while workers no longer have to pay
more taxes to fill the gap of government budget due to fewer tax revenues.
To summarize, the welfare conflict lies in the choice of both policy instruments. But
entrepreneurs and workers only have different preferences in debt policy in the qualitative
sense.
2.6.2 Constant Volatility of Idiosyncratic Investment Risks
This subsection carries out the baseline policy experiment in which the government
chooses both the responses of fiscal policy instruments to output except that the volatility
of idiosyncratic investment risks is set to be constant, σ2e,t = σ
2
e . Figure 2.6 plots the wel-
fare change of entrepreneurs, workers and social utility, if the government only modifies
the response of the capital tax rate to output, mY τ , or if the government only changes
the response of the debt to output, mY B.
A comparison of Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.6 clearly shows a difference in the welfare
change with countercyclical and constant idiosyncratic investment risks. First, coun-
tercyclical idiosyncratic investment risks enlarge the scale of welfare change. Second,
countercyclical risks influence the cyclical choice of fiscal policy that aims to maximize
the welfare of certain groups. With constant idiosyncratic investment risks, entrepreneurs
prefer a higher tax rate in the recession, but much lower than the preferred policy with
countercyclical idiosyncratic investment risks. Workers, unlike in the baseline case, choose
an even higher tax rate than the one entrepreneurs favor in the recession. Meanwhile,
entrepreneurs turn to a higher debt level in the recession, while workers prefer a relatively
constant but still countercyclical debt policy.
In a nutshell, countercyclical idiosyncratic investment risks magnify the fluctuations of
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(b) Welfare Change as mY B Changes (Consumption Tax)
Figure 2.5: Robustness Check: Consumption Tax
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(b) Welfare Change as mY B Changes (Constant Idiosyncratic investment risks)
Figure 2.6: Robustness Check: Constant Idiosyncratic investment risks
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capital and output; in particular, investors are far less likely to lose in the boom thanks to
asymmetry of idiosyncratic investment risks in the boom and in the bust, thus investors
are inclined to the tax policy that encourages more investment in the expansion. The
asymmetry of risks disappears with constant idiosyncratic risks and the gap of expected
return to capital in the expansion and in the recession shrinks. Therefore the fluctuation
effect becomes relatively more important to investors, and as a result, they choose a less
volatile tax policy and a countercyclical debt policy.
Workers prefer a procyclical tax policy with constant idiosyncratic investment risks
because it raises the capital stock and wage. They have fewer concerns for higher mean
of labor tax because of less volatility in the aggregate economy.
The result of the welfare conflict between entrepreneurs and workers no longer holds
with constant idiosyncratic investment risks in the qualitative sense though different
groups choose different quantitative responses of fiscal policy to output.
To sum up, countercyclicality of idiosyncratic investment risks matters for the choice
of the cyclical property of fiscal policy.
2.6.3 No Idiosyncratic Investment Risks
This subsection shuts down idiosyncratic investment risks and reassesses fiscal policies.
Notice that the model features heterogeneity even without idiosyncratic risks because
entrepreneurs and workers are assumed to receive income from different sources. Figure 2.7
plots the welfare change of entrepreneurs, workers and social utility under different capital
tax policy if the debt policy is fixed, or under different debt policy if the capital tax policy
is fixed.
Figure 2.7 shows the same pattern in the welfare change of the three groups as with
constant idiosyncratic investment risks. Qualitatively, all groups prefer a procyclical
capital tax policy and a countercyclical debt policy.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper focuses on studying the effect of fiscal policies over the business cycle on
investment and the welfare of heterogeneous agents under idiosyncratic investment risks,
which is novel in macroeconomics. Idiosyncratic investment risks, although proven to
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(b) Welfare Change as mY B Changes (No Idiosyncratic investment risks)
Figure 2.7: Welfare Change of Diﬀerent Groups without Idiosyncratic investment risks
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have a larger standard deviation than the one of idiosyncratic labor income risks, draw
less attention and are underdeveloped, especially in the literature on business cycle. My
study, together with a few others, pioneers merging idiosyncratic investment risks into
the business cycle framework and applies the model to answer specific questions. I use
the framework to first generate the level and dynamics of income distribution and then
conduct several fiscal policy experiments.
My model takes into account three observations. First, wealth is highly concentrated
among the rich. Second, wealth tends to be invested in an undiversified portfolio, even
for the rich who in general have more investment options. Third, poor diversification in
investment implies high idiosyncratic investment risks, which, furthermore, increase in
the recession. The third observation is little considered in previous studies. I model it,
associating idiosyncratic investment risks with aggregate productivity.
The model provides a tractable tool to analyze the dynamics of aggregate variables
and income distribution, discuss the welfare change, and evaluate fiscal policy over the
business cycle under the context of heterogeneous agents. The tractability results from
the assumption of i.i.d idiosyncratic investment risks which render saving and portfolio
independent of wealth distribution. All entrepreneurs behavior identically conditional on
their wealth so that exact aggregation can be achieved.
The model matches the level and dynamics of income inequality as in the US data.
The simulated income distribution features large income shares in top income groups
and small income shares in bottom income groups as shown in the Current Population
Survey data. As for the cyclical property of income distribution, the simulated result
qualitatively matches most of the correlations of income shares with output, and 95/50
and 50/20 ratios.
I answer the question of when to tax capital income and when to issue more debt,
both of which are rarely explored in the literature. The policy experiment emphasizes a
welfare conflict between entrepreneurs and workers. The qualitative result on debt policy
is robust to a modified model with a constant labor tax rate and a varying consumption
tax levied only on entrepreneurs to balance the government budget. But the welfare
conflict disappears after removing the countercyclicality of idiosyncratic investment risks
or removing these risks at all.
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Appendix
2.A Proof of Lemma 1
I start from showing the characterization of allocations and choices in the individual
level.
The Euler equations derived from the entrepreneur optimization problem are
(cit)
−γ = βsEt
{
(cit+1)
−γ[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1]
}
, (2.26)
(cit)
−γ = βsEt
{
(cit+1)
−γ[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}
. (2.27)
I guess that the solution to the entrepreneur optimization problem is as follows:
cit = νtx
i
t, and k
i
t+1 = (1−νt)φtxit, so bit+1 = (1−νt)(1−φt)xit from the budget constraint
of the entrepreneur. I will determine later the coefficients νt and φt which only depend
on the current aggregate state. To simplify the notation, I define the aggregate state at
t, St = (Kt, Bt, zt, gt). Then I write νt = νt(St) and φt = φt(St). With some algebra,
xit+1 =
[
(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1
]
kit+1 + [(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]bit+1
=
{
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}
(1− νt(St))xit.
(2.28)
Then the first Euler equation becomes
νt(St)
−γ(xit)
−γ = βsEt
{
(νt+1(St+1)x
i
t+1)
−γ[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1]
}
= βs(1− νt(St))−γ(xit)−γEt
{
νt+1(St+1)
−γ[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1]{
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1)
+1]}−γ} .
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Then we cross out the same factors from both handsides,
νt(St)
−γ = βs(1− νt(St))−γEt
{
νt+1(St+1)
−γ[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1]{
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}}−γ} .
(2.29)
Likewise, the second Euler equation can be transformed as
νt(St)
−γ = βs(1− νt(St))−γEt
{
νt+1(St+1)
−γ[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]{
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}−γ}
.
(2.30)
Combining these two equations, we obtain the equality between the gross returns of
risky and risk-free assets:
0 = Et
{
νt+1(St+1)
−γ(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ + 1−Rt+1){
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}−γ}
.
=
∫ ∞
0
(∫ ∞
0
νt+1(St+1)
−γ(1− τat+1)(r(eit+1, zt+1, w(zt+1); zt)− δ + 1−Rt+1){
φt(st)[(1− τat+1)(r(eit+1, zt+1, w(zt+1); zt)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}−γ
dF (eit+1)
)
dF (zt+1).
(2.31)
Multiply the above Equations 26 and 27 with φt and 1− φt, respectively, and sum up
to get:
νt(St)
−γ = βs(1− νt(St))−γEt
{
νt+1(St+1)
−γ{
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}1−γ}
.
(2.32)
Define φt = arg maxφ∈[0,1]CEt
{
φt[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt)[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}
,
2.A. PROOF OF LEMMA 1 77
where
CEt
{
φt[(1− τat+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt)[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}
=
[∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ ∞
−∞
{
φt(St)[(1− τat+1)(r(eit+1, zt+1, w(zt+1); zt)− δ) + 1]+
+ (1− φt(St))[(1− τat+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1]
}1−γ
dF (eit+1)
)
dF (zt+1)
] 1
1− γ .
(2.33)
The process requires numerical solutions. The preceding integral demonstrates that the
optimal saving and portfolio choices depend only on the aggregate state. I drop the
notation of aggregate state since now.
Given φt and τ
a
t+1, νt can be computed by (31).
Next I derive the functional form of the value function for entrepreneurs. I first guess
that the value function V (xit) = ψtu(x
i
t). From the envelope theorem, V
′(xit) = u
′(cit),
which is
ψt(x
i
t)
−γ = (cit)
−γ = [νt(xit)]
−γ
I simplify the above equation by crossing out the common factor so that
ψt = ν
−γ
t . (2.34)
Hence, V (xit) =
ν−γt (x
i
t)
1−γ
1− γ .
Now I verify whether the value function obtained fits the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem. Notice that V (xit) =
(cit)
1−γ
1− γ +βsEtV (x
i
t+1). I insert the expressions of the value
function and consumption, Eq. (13), into the equation.
ν−γt (x
i
t)
1−γ
1− γ =
[νt(x
i
t)]
1−γ
1− γ + βsEt
[
ν−γt+1(x
i
t+1)
1−γ
1− γ
]
I multiply both handsides by (1− γ), remove the first term on the right handside to the
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left, and combine the two terms on the left handside,
νt(1− νt)−γ(xit)1−γ
= βsEt
[
(1− νt+1)−γx1−γi,t+1
]
= βsEt
[
(1− νt+1)−γ
{
(1− τat+1)[φt(r(Ait+1, wt+1) + 1− δ)+
+ (1− φt)Rt+1]νt(xit)
}1−γ]
.
Then I eliminate the common factors νt and (x
i
t)
1−γ from both handsides,
(1−νt)−γ = βsν−γt Et
[
(1− νt+1)−γ
{
(1− τat+1)[φt(r(Ait+1, wt+1) + 1− δ) + (1− φt)Rt+1]
}1−γ]
,
which is validated by (31). 
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2.B Effect of idiosyncratic investment risks
This section shows how idiosyncratic investment risks affect the portfolio choice at the
steady state. For the exposional convenience, I simply assume the risk aversion degree
γ = 1, that is, the logarithm case.
From the wage determination wt = (1 − α) (ztKt)α and the specification of risks, I
rewrite the expression of individual capital investment return
rit+1 = α
(
1− α
wt+1
) 1
α
−1
Ait+1
= αzα−1t+1 K
α−1
t+1 A
i
t+1
= αzαt+1K
α−1
t+1 exp
[−σ2e
2
+ eit+1
]
= rˇt+1 exp
(
eit+1
)
,
(2.35)
where rˇt+1 denotes αz
α
t+1K
α−1
t+1 exp
[−σ2e,t+1
2
]
, showing risk-adjusted average return to
capital in the economy.
CEt
{
φt
(
rit+1 − δ
)
+ (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)
}
≈
(∫ ∞
−∞
[φt (rˇt+1 − δ) + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)]1−γ + 1− γ
2
σ2e,t+1{−γ [φt (rˇt+1 − δ) + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)]−γ−1 (φtrˇt+1)2 +
+ [φt (rˇt+1 − δ) + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)]−γ φtrˇt+1
}
dF
(
zt+1
)) 1
1− γ
(2.36)
I take the first order condition with respect to φt to pin down the optimal portfolio
choice.
∫ ∞
−∞
{[
(rˇt+1 + 1− δ −Rt+1)3 +
σ2e,t+1
2
(1− γ) [(1− γ)rˇ2t+1 + (1− δ −Rt+1)rˇt+1] (rˇt+1 + 1− δ −Rt+1)]φ2t+
+
{
2 (rˇt+1 + 1− δ −Rt+1)2 +
σ2e,t+1
2
[
(2− 3γ)rˇ2t+1 + (2− γ)rˇt+1(1− δ −Rt+1)
]}
(Rt+1 − 1)φt+
+(Rt+1 − 1)2
[(
1 +
σ2e,t+1
2
)
rˇt+1 + 1− δ −Rt+1
]}
dF
(
zt+1
)
= 0
(2.37)
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The deterministic steady state rules out the aggregate shocks. I list the certainty
equivalent and its derivative with respect to φt at the steady state in the following.
CE
≈ [φ (rˇ − δ) + (1− φ)(R− 1)]1−γ + 1− γ
2
σ2e
{−γ [φ (rˇ − δ) + (1− φ)(R− 1)]−γ−1 (φrˇ)2 +
+ [φ (rˇ − δ) + (1− φ)(R− 1)]−γ φrˇ} 11− γ
(2.38)
[
(rˇ + 1− δ −R)3 + σ
2
e
2
(1− γ) [(1− γ)rˇ2 + (1− δ −R)rˇ] (rˇ + 1− δ −R)]φ2+
+
{
2 (rˇ + 1− δ −R)2 + σ
2
e
2
[
(2− 3γ)rˇ2 + (2− γ)rˇ(1− δ −R)]} (R− 1)φ+
+ (R− 1)2
[(
1 +
σ2e
2
)
rˇ + 1− δ −R
]
= 0
(2.39)
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2.C Coefficient of Variation of Income
I first report the coefficient of variation of entrepreneurs’ income at t + 1 conditional
on t’s information Coef.Var.t(I
i
t+1).
Conditional expectation of t+ 1’s income of entrepreneurs at t is
Et(I it+1)
= Et
[
rit+1k
i
t+1 + (Rt+1 − 1)bit+1
]
= Et
{
νtx
i
t
[
φtr
i
t+1 + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)
]}
= νtx
i
t
[
φtαz
αρz exp
(
1
2
α2σ2z
)
Kα−1t+1 + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)
]
;
Conditional variance of t+ 1’s income of entrepreneurs at t is
Vart(I
i
t+1)
= Vart
[
rit+1k
i
t+1 + (Rt+1 − 1)bit+1
]
= ν2t x
2
i,tVart
[
φtr
i
t+1 + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)
]
= ν2t x
2
i,tVart
[
φtr
i
t+1
]
= ν2t x
2
i,tφ
2
tα
2z2αρzK
2(α−1)
t+1
{
exp
[
σ2e exp(−ηρz log zt) +
1
2
(2α− ησ2e)2σ2z
]
− exp (α2σ2z)} .
Thus, the coefficient of variation is computed as the dividend of the standard deviation
and the expectation.
Coef.Var.t(I
i
t+1) =
φtαz
αρzKα−1t+1
√
exp
[
σ2e exp(−ηρz log zt) +
1
2
(2α− ησ2e)2σ2z
]
− exp (α2σ2z)
φtαzαρz exp
(
1
2
α2σ2z
)
Kα−1t+1 + (1− φt)(Rt+1 − 1)
.
Next I derive the coefficient of variation of workers’ income at t+ 1 conditional on t’s
information Coef.Var.t(I
j
t+1).
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Conditional expectation of t+ 1’s income of workers at t is
Et(Ijt+1)
= Et
[
wt+1e
j
t+1
]
= Et
[
(1− α)zαt+1Kαt+1ejt+1
]
= (1− α)zαρzt Kαt+1eρwj,t exp
[
1
2
(α2σ2z + σ
2
w)
]
;
Conditional variance of t+ 1’s income of workers at t is
Vart(I
j
t+1)
= Vart
[
wt+1e
j
t+1
]
= Vart
[
(1− α)zαt+1Kαt+1ejt+1
]
= (1− α)2z2αρzt K2αt+1e2ρwj,t
[
exp
(
2α2σ2z + 2σ
2
w
)− exp (α2σ2z + σ2w)] .
Then the coefficient of variation is
Coef.Var.t(I
j
t+1) =
√
exp (α2σ2z + σ
2
w)− 1.
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2.D Welfare for Hand-to-mouth Workers
From (4)
log ejt+1 = ρw log e
j
t + 
j
t+1,
we have that
E0 (log ej,t) = E0 (ρw log ej,t−1) + E0 (j,t) = 0;
Var0 (log ej,t) =
σ2w
1− ρ2w
;
E0 (ej,t) = exp
(
σ2w
2(1− ρ2w)
)
,∀t;
and furthermore,
E0
(
e1−γj,t
)
= exp
(
σ2w(1− γ)2
2(1− ρ2w)
)
,∀t.
Then the summed unconditional mean of utility at t across workers is
∫
j
E0
{
(cjt)
1−γ
1− γ
}
=
∫
j
E0

[(1− τnt )
1
λ
wtej,t]
1−γ
1− γ

= λγE0
{
[(1− τnt )wt]1−γ
1− γ
}
exp
(
σ2w(1− γ)2
2(1− ρ2w)
)
.
(2.40)
At last, the value function of workers is expressed as
∫
j
V (xj0) =
∫
j
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(cjt)
1−γ
1− γ
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫
j
E0
{
(cjt)
1−γ
1− γ
}
= λγ
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{
[(1− τnt )wt]1−γ
1− γ
}
exp
(
σ2w(1− γ)2
2(1− ρ2w)
)
.
(2.41)
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2.F Solution to Modified Entrepreneurs’ Problem
cit =
νtx
i
t
1− τ ct
, (2.42)
kit+1 = (1− νt)φtxit, (2.43)
bit+1 = (1− νt)(1− φt)xit, (2.44)
where the marginal propensity to consume out of effective wealth, νt, and the share of
private equity in the portfolio, φt, are two stochastic coefficients, depending solely on the
current aggregate states, st, and satisfying
φt = arg max
φ∈[0,1]
CEt
{
φ[(1− τ kt+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φ)Rt+1
}
, (2.45)
ν−γt
(1− τ ct )1−γ
= βs(1− νt)−γEt
{
ν−γt+1
(1− τ ct+1)1−γ
{φt[(1− τ kt+1)(r(Ait+1, wt+1)− δ) + 1] + (1− φt)Rt+1}1−γ
}
,
(2.46)
where CE represents the certainty equivalent of an entrepreneur.5
Define the value function for entrepreneurs as V (xit) which is given by
V (xit) =
ν−γt (x
i
t)
1−γ
(1− γ)(1− τ ct+1)1−γ
. (2.47)
5I denote βs = β(1− Prd)
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